Narcotics News Update - 9/9/89

We have learned that the Kokang leaders, formerly under the CPB, are going all out to cultivate poppies and produce opium. The Kokang district is already the number one opium growing area in the Golden Triangle. The current price of opium is approx. Kyats 7,000 in the open market but the Kokang leadership have artificially suppressed the price and by order, are forcing the villagers to sell opium to the Kokang leadership for Kyats 4,800.

In addition, villagers who did not grow opium are being forced to buy opium in the open market for Kyats 7,000 and then are forced to sell the opium back to the Kokang authorities for Kyats 4,800.

The opium that is collected in this way is being refined into heroin and smuggled to outside markets in 50 gallon barrels with the cooperation of the Burma Army and Lo Hsing Han.

The Northern Shan State Burma Army Commander, Brig Maung Tint, visited the Kokang area this past June and he gave the Kokang officials government approval to continue growing opium. When Brig Maung Tint left the Kokang area he took with him an unspecified quantity of heroin.

The locations where the Kokang are refining heroin include:

1. Mung Hom - 3 locations
2. Mung Gu - 1 location
3. Hpong Seng - 1 location

It is known that a veteran CPB cadre named Ye Hu of Chinese nationality has been given permission from the Kokang authorities to operate and refine heroin in their territory and under their protection.

It has also been learned that the Burma Army is encouraging villagers in the Putao area of northern Kachin State to grow opium as well.

In the Northern Shan State, in the Kachin Substate area, near Lashio and Dang Yan towns and along the Loi Chye area, the Rangoon military authorities have given the local population permission and encouragement to grow opium.

In the Mung Dun and Mung Sat areas, when the Hlung Hting or Burmese Security forces arrived, they began encouraging the local population to increase opium production.


The commander of the Burma Army Regiment 49 based in Mung Dun has been collecting taxes from the villagers and has assigned the Na Kong Mu People's Militia the task of refining opium. They have now set up 3 facilities/refineries between Na Kong Mu and Mung Dun.

The price of raw opium along the Thai border is now about Kyats 10,000.

For more information on how AIU's Worldwide Insurance Services for Exporters can meet your worldwide export insurance needs, contact your broker or call 1-800-343-4930

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A Member of
American International Group, Inc.



BURMA

SALES FIGURE EXPRESSED IN LOCAL CURRENCY — KYAT

...953-9035
...AL & RURAL DEVELOPMENT
...TION
...Road, Rangoon, Pegu
...A
...1 5083
...Mktg
Employees NA

...S 65-953-9704
...CULTURAL CORPORATION
...Road, Rangoon, Pegu
...NA
...2139
...Crop Farms
Employees NA

D-U-N-S 65-953-9043 IMP EXP
...MA FIVE STAR SHIPPING CORP
...36 Theinbyu Rd, Rangoon, Pegu
...ex 21209
...NA
Employees 870
...Started 1959
...412
...Fgn Transp
...Than, *Man Dir*

...S 65-953-9829
...MA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
...Rangoon, Pegu
...NA
Employees NA
...534
...ceutical Prep

...S 65-953-9886 IMP
...MA RAILWAYS CORPORATION
...Aung San St, Rangoon, Pegu
...RHEOSTAT
...NA
Employees 27,500
...
...Pr Opertn
...Man Dir

...S 65-953-9944
...TRUCTION CORPORATION
...Pagoda Road, Rangoon, Pegu
...NA
Employees NA
...541
...Constr

D-U-N-S 65-953-9019
ELECTRIC POWER CORP
Rose Bank Rd, Ahtone, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
SIC 4911
Electric Services

D-U-N-S 65-953-9357 IMP EXP
FOODSTUFFS & GENERAL MERCHANDISE TRADE CORPORATION
11/17 Bogala Bazaar Street, Rangoon, Pegu
1384
Cable/Telex 21305
Sales 568 000 M
Employees 2,320
Year Started 1976
SIC 5043 5141 5143 5091
Photo Eqp & Sups

D-U-N-S 65-953-9647 IMP
HOTEL & TOURIST CORP
77-91 Sule Pagoda Road, Rangoon, Pegu 1114
Cable/Telex 21330
Sales 166 100 M
Employees 3,200
Year Started 1965
SIC 7011 4729
Hotels & Motels
U Maung Maung Aye, *Man Dir*

D-U-N-S 65-953-9761
MYANMA EXPORT AND IMPORT CORPORATION
34/42 Strand Road, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
SIC 5199 5099
Nondurable Gds Nec

D-U-N-S 65-953-9027
MYANMA FOREIGN TRADG BANK
81-86 Barr St, Rangoon, Pegu
Cable/Telex BM 2006
Sales NA
Employees 540
Year Started 1969
SIC 6029
Commercial Bks Nec
U Ko Ko lay, *Man Dir*

D-U-N-S 65-953-9589 IMP EXP
MYANMA GEMS CORPORATION
66 Kaba Ave Pagoda Rd, Rangoon, Pegu 11061
Cable/Telex 21506
Sales 60 000 M
Employees 800
Year Started 1965
SIC 5094 5944
Jly, Precious Stones
U Hla Thein, *Man Dir*

D-U-N-S 65-953-9118
RESTAURAN & BEVERAGE TRADE CORPORATION
No 326 Maha Bandoola St, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales 379 M
Employees NA
SIC 5141 5145 5461 5441
Whl Gen Groceries

D-U-N-S 65-954-0009 IMP
ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
375 Bogyoke Aung San Street, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees 14,000
Year Started 1961
SIC 4111
Local, Subn Transit
U Myo Aung, *Man Dir*

D-U-N-S 65-953-9290
TRADE CORPORATION NO 1
70 Phayre St, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
SIC 5141 5411
Whl Gen Groceries

D-U-N-S 65-953-9597
TRADE CORPORATION NO 10
189/191 Maha Bandoola Street, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
SIC 5169 5912
Chemicals, Rel Pdts

D-U-N-S 65-953-9779
TRADE CORPORATION NO 15
3 St John's Road, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
...5211 5251

D-U-N-S 65-953-9837
TRADE CORPORATION NO 17
81 Theinbyu Street, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
SIC 5052
Coal, Rel Mnrl, Ores

D-U-N-S 65-953-9050 IMP
TRADE CORPORATION NO 5
19/43 Maung Taulay Street, Rangoon, Pegu
Cable/Telex TEX TRADE
Sales NA
Employees NA
Year Started 1963
SIC 5131 5699
Piece Gds & Notions

D-U-N-S 65-953-9472
TRADE CORPORATION NO 8
526/532 Merchant Street, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
SIC 5111 5043 5943 5946 2759
Prtg & Writing Ppr

D-U-N-S 65-953-9530
TRADE CORPORATION NO 9
550-552 Merchant Street, Rangoon, Pegu
Sales NA
Employees NA
SIC 5199 5112 5942 5943
Nondurable Gds Nec

D-U-N-S 54-800-0033
CIMENTERIES DU CAMEROUN SA IMP EXP
Douala
Cable/Telex 5325
Sales 27 138 000 M
Year Started 1965
SIC 3241
Hydraulic Cement
Adama Modi, *President*
Employees 624

D-U-N-S 54-800-0504
CHOCOLATERIE CAMEROUNAISE CONFISERIE SA
Po Box 275 Zi De Bassa, Douala
Cable/Telex 5332
Sales 6 000 000 M
Year Started 1965
SIC 2066 2064
Chocolate, Cocoa Pdt
Mr Edjengueie
Employees 557

D-U-N-S 86-960-4801
CAMEROUN STEEL PRODUITS SA
Zi De Bonaberi, Douala
Cable/Telex 6071
Sales 1 900 000 M
Year Started 1977
SIC 3316 3312
Cold Finshg Steel
Mehta J Pradip, *Dir Gen*
Employees 70

CAMEROUN BRASSERIES
...18 Rue Jo...
Cable/Telex ...
Sales 24 919...M
Year Started 19...
SIC 4493
Marinas
Rene Mbayen, *Dg*
...M
...1969
Employees 520
...Blended Lq
...eph Kadji Defosso, *Pr/Dir Gen*

D-U-N-S 86-960-2250
UNION D'ENTREPRISES CAMEROUNAISES SA
Yaounde
Cable/Telex 8315
Sales 3 500 000 M
Employees 1,000
Year Started 1976
SIC 1629
Heavy Construction
M Pescheux, *Pr*

D-U-N-S 86-960-5402
ETS ARNO SARL
Rue De Pau, Douala
Cable/Telex 15500
Sales 3 200 000 M
Year Started 1968
SIC 5099 5199
Durable Goods Nec
Anestis Arnopoulos, *Administrator*
Employees 60

D-U-N-S 86-960-...
DACAM SA
59 Rue Docteur Jamot, Douala
Cable/Telex 5237
Sales 3 000 000 M
Year Started 1975
SIC 5039
Construction Mtls
Jean Paul Pardi, *Pr*
Edible
Angelos
...cteur Gen

...LE DE MATERIAUX DE ... SARL
...8591 KN
...00 000 M
Employees 70
... *Started* 1984
...IC 3089 3462 3499
Plastic Pdts Nec
Emmanuel Fenkam

LE PLA... (SA) EXP
Zi De Bassa
Cable/Telex ...
Sales 33 272 5...
Year Started 1961
SIC 2675 3089
Die-Cut Paper, Board
Daniel Forget, *Pr*
Employees 67
...s
...irecteur

D-U-N-S 86-960-2763
SOCIETE INDUSTRIELLE DES CRAYONS ET FOURNITURES SA
Zone Industrielle De Bassa, Douala
Sales 2 383 468 M
Employees 150
Year Started 1979
SIC 3089
Plastic Pdts Nec
Jean Samuel Noutchogouin, *Pr*

CAMEROON COLLEGE

9238-000

AMOCO CORPORATION
200 E. Randolph Dr., Chicago, IL 60680-0703
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 87703, Chicago, IL 60680
Tel.: 312-856-6111 **IN**
SN—(NYSE Bo Ci MW Ph)
Approx. Rev.: $22,388,000,000
Emp: 46,774
Fiscal Year-end: 12/31/87
Conducting Petroleum & Chemical Opers.; Holding Co.
S.I.C.: 6719; 1311; 2819; 2821; 2911; 1321; 4612; 4613; 2221; 2865; 2869; 3085; 3086
Richard M. Morrow *(Chm. Bd. & Chief Exec. Officer)*
James W. Cozad *(Vice Chm.)*
H. Laurance Fuller *(Pres.)*
W. R. Peirson *(Exec. V.P.)*
R. H. Leet *(Exec. V. P.)*
W. R. Hutchinson *(V.P. & Controller)*
F. S. Addy *(V.P.-Fin.)*
E. A. Mason *(V.P.-Research)*
R. W. Anderson *(V.P.-Human Resources)*
L. Bates Lea *(V.P. & Gen. Counsel)*
R. A. Johnson *(V.P.-Pub. & Govt. Affairs)*
R. L. Fischer *(V.P.-Govt. Affairs)*
J. R. Lyman *(V.P.-Plan., Econ. & Devel.)*
D. R. Mitchell *(Gen. Tax Counsel)*
J. E. Allard *(V.P. & Treas.)*
J. R. Reid *(Gen. Mgr. Information Services)*
R. E. Callahan *(Sec.)*

6814-008

The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*(Transfer Agent)*
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, NY 10081 (DE)
Tel.: 212-552-2222 (100%)

3648-030

The First National Bank of Chicago*(Transfer Agent)*
One First Natl. Plza., Chicago, IL 60670
Tel.: 312-732-4050

4440-000

The National Trust Company*(Transfer Agent)*
4 King St. West, Toronto, ON M5H 3W7 Canada
Tel.: 416-688-2492

Foreign Holdings:

9238-030

Amoco Abu Dhabi Exploration Co. **(1)**
Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates (100%)
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311

9238-031

Amoco Argentina Oil Co. **(1)**
Casilla de Correo 5092 Maipu 942
Buenos Aires 1340 Argentina
Tel.: 34-4011/15 (100%)
Telex: 390-21369 or 390-22127
Cable: AMOCOAR
Emp: 270
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311; 1382
Floyd W. Boyd, Jr. *(Pres. & G.M.)*

9238-079

Amoco Andina Production Co. **(1)**
Casilla de Correo 5092 Maipu 942
Buenos Aires 1340 Argentina
Tel.: 34-4011/5
Telex: 2-1369 2-2127
Cable: AMOCOAR
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311; 1382
W. Boyd, Jr. *(Pres. & G.M.)*

Petroleum Co. **(1)**
Sydney N.S.W.

9238-033

T. D. Stacy *(Pres.)*

9238-035

Amoco Chemicals Belgium N.V. **(1)**
Belgium (100%)
Mfr. & Sales of Chemical Prods.
S.I.C.: 5169; 2869

9238-072

Amoco Chemicals (UK) Ltd. **(1)**
One Olympic Way Wembley
Middlesex HA9 0ND United Kingdom
Tel.: 01-902-8820
Telex: 928596

9238-073

Amoco Chemicals Far East, Ltd. **(1)**
11th Fl., Far East Finance Centre
16 Harcourt Rd. Hong Kong Hong Kong-
Tel.: 5-290370 (100%)
Telex: 780-75657
Market Dev. & Marketing of Chemicals, Polymers, Petroleum Additives & Synthetic Fibers
S.I.C.: 5162; 5169
G. A. Nersesian *(Pres. & Mgr. Dir.)*

9238-081

Amoco Chemicals Pty. Ltd. **(1)**
28-34 Orange Grove Road
Liverpool, N.S.W. 2170, Australia (100%)
Importing, Exporting, Producing, and Marketing Petroleum Additives and Synthetic Fabrics
S.I.C.: 5162; 5169
J. J. Monohan *(Mng. Dir.)*

9238-037

Amoco Colombia Oil Co. **(1)**
Apartado Aereo 093906 Bogota, Colombia
Tel.: 212-7666 (100%)
Telex: 396-41256
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311

9238-038

Amoco Chemicals (Europe) S.A. **(1)**
15, rue Rothschild 1211 Geneva 21 Switzerland
Tel.: (022) 31 0281 (100%)
Telex: 845-422787
Coordination of Chemical Activity in Europe, Africa, Middle East
S.I.C.: 2869

9238-039

Amoco Deutschland GmbH **(1)**
Duppelstrasse 16 D-4432 Gronau-Westf W. Germany
Tel.: 2562-771 (100%)
Telex: 841-89698
Mfr. & Sale of Synthetic Fabrics
S.I.C.: 2221

9238-040

Amoco Egypt Oil Co. **(1)**
Box 2409 Cairo Egypt
Tel.: 9-011-20-2 353-0703 (100%)
Telex: 927 21483
Cable: AMOCOEGYPT CAIRO
Emp: 80
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
C. M. Carr *(Pres. & Gen. Mgr.)*

9238-041

Amoco Espana Exploration Co. **(1)**
Paseo De La Castellana 91 28046 Madrid Spain
Tel.: 445-0801 (100%)
Telex: 83144465
Cable: AMOCOINOIL
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
K. Akhavi *(Mng. Dir.)*

9238-074

Amoco Fabrics and Fibers, Ltd. **(1)**
1423 Cameron St. Hawkesbury ON K6A 2R8 Canada
Tel.: 613-632-4191 (100%)
Telex: 05 839-500
Mfg. Synthetic Fabrics & Fibers
S.I.C.: 2221
K. M. Thompson *(Pres.)*

9238-082

Amoco Fabrics (U.K.) Ltd. **(1)**
Delves Lane Mills, Delves Lane, Consett, Co. Durham DH8 7PE United Kingdom (100%)
Weaving, Spinning, Mfg., and Merchandising of Fabrics and Textiles
S.I.C.: 2221

Telex: 981-8268
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311

9238-047

Amoco Indonesia Petroleum Co. **(1)**
Citibank Bldg., 4th Fl. Jl M.H. Thamrin No. 55 Jakarta Indonesia
Tel.: 328007 (100%)
Telex: 796-45342
Prod. & Mktg. Petroleum
S.I.C.: 5171; 1311

9238-083

Amoco Madagascar S.A. **(1)**
Villa 3H, Ampasamitafo Ivandry, Antanarivo, Madagascar (100%)
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas; Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
S.A. Greer *(Pres.)*

9238-049

Amoco Madagascar Petroleum Company **(1)**
Madagascar (100%)
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311

9238-051

Amoco Netherlands Petroleum Co. **(1)**
Stichthage (Central Station)
Koningin Julianplein 10 2595 AA The Hague The Netherlands
Tel.: (070) 490-911 (100%)
Telex: 844-32726
Cable: AMOCONED-THE HAGUE
Telefax: 070-471675
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
B. C. Holmes *(Pres. & G.M.)*

9238-052

Amoco Norway Oil Co. **(1)**
P.O. Box 388 Bergjelandsgata 25 4001 Stavanger Norway
Tel.: 04-50-20-00 (100%)
Telex: 42780
Telefax: 4-502218
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
M. Zimmerman *(Pres. & G.M.)*

9238-053

Amoco Oman Petroleum Co. **(1)**
P.O. Box 4690 Ruwi Sultinate of Oman Oman
Tel.: 698402 (100%)
Telex: 926-5675
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
M. L. Harper *(Pres. & Res. Mgr.)*

9238-056

Amoco Ras Al Khaimah Oil Co. **(1)**
Ras Al Khaimah United Arab Emirates (100%)
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311

9238-042

Amoco Services, Inc. **(1)**
Amoco House, 1 Stephen St., Tottemhem Court Rd. London W1P 1PJ United Kingdom (100%)
Renders Staff Services to Various Amoco Subsidiaries
S.I.C.: 8741

9238-084

Amoco Sharjah LPG Co. **(1)**
Al Rostamani Bldg., King Faisel Rd.
P.O. Box 1191, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
Tel.: 355100 (100%)
Telex: 944-68685
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
D. F. Vehrs *(Pres.)*

9238-058

Amoco Sharjah Oil Co. **(1)**
P.O. Box 1191 Sharjah United Arab Emirates
Tel.: 355100 (100%)
Telex: 68685
Cable: AMCOSH EM
Telefax: 355142
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
R. W. Rausch *(Pres. & Gen. Mgr.)*

9238-060

Cable: AMOCOEX LONDON
Telefax: 01-631-4848 01-580-3193
Emp: 700
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311
H. W. Dalton *(Pres.)*

9238-063

Amoco (U.K.) Ltd. **(1)**
Lynnhill House, Church St.
Altrincham Cheshire WA14 4DZ United Kingdom
Tel.: (061) 9288610 (100%)
Telex: 851-668301
Refining & Mktg.
S.I.C.: 2911; 5171

9238-064

China American Petrochemical Co., Ltd. **(1)**
Taiwan (50%)
Mfr. & Sale of Chemical Prods.
S.I.C.: 2869; 5169

9238-065

Fertilizers of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd. **(1)**
Trinidad & Tobago (49%)
Mfr. of Fertilizers
S.I.C.: 2873

9238-066

Gulf of Suez Petroleum Co. **(1)**
Palestine St., 4th Sector, New Maed
P.O. Box 2400 Cairo, Egypt
Tel.: 352-0038 (50%)
Telex: 927-92248
Exploration & Production
S.I.C.: 1311

9238-068

Rhodiaco Industries Quimicas Ltda. **(1)**
Brazil (31%)
Mfr. & Sale of Chemical Prods.
S.I.C.: 2869; 5169

9238-069

Samsung Petrochemical Co. Ltd. **(1)**
Korea (35%)
Mfr. & Sale of Chemical Prods.
S.I.C.: 5169; 2869

9238-070

Singapore Petroleum Co. Pte., Ltd. **(1)**
Maxwell Rd., P.O. Box 2058 6
Shenton Way #42-01, DBS Bldg
Singapore 9040 Singapore
Tel.: 2213166 (31%)
Telex: SPC RS 21430
Emp: 95
Refining & Mktg.
S.I.C.: 2911; 5171
Cheng Hong Kok *(Pres. & Chief Oper. Officer)*

6359-000

AMPCO-PITTSBURGH CORPORATION
600 Grant St., Ste. 4600, Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Tel.: 412-456-4400 **PA**
AP—(NYSE Ph)
Approx. Sls.: $320,426,000
Emp: 4,300
Fiscal Year-end: 12/31/87
Mfr. of Engineered Equip., Steel Prods., Specialty Metal Prods.
S.I.C.: 3364; 3462; 3547
Marshall L. Berkman *(Chm. Bd. & Chief Exec. Officer)*
Robert A. Paul *(Pres. & Chief Oper. Officer)*
Ernest G. Siddons *(Sr. V.P.-Fin. & Treas.)*
James Huber *(V.P.-Pur.)*
Edward H. Moores *(V.P.-Legal & Sec.)*
Sidney Wasser *(V.P. & Controller)*
Ronald W. Hasek *(Mgr.-Mktg. Services)*
Robert F. Schultz *(Dir.-Indus. Rels.)*

3662-022

Mellon Bank, N.A.*(Transfer Agent)*
Mellon Sq., Pittsburgh, PA 15230
Tel.: 412-391-5210

Ampco Metal S.A. **(1)**
Fribourg Switzerland
Produces Copper Alloys
S.I.C.: 3366
Louis C. Begg *(Pres.-Europe)*

Ampco Metal Nordiska AB
Box 61, Mockelvagen 38 Stock...
Sweden
Tel.: 011-46-8-824-4020
Produces Copper Alloys
S.I.C.: 3366
Louis C. Begg *(Pres.-Europe)*

Ampco Metal Nederlands B...
P.O. Box 56 3440 AB Woerd...
Netherlands
Tel.: 011-31-34-801-3636
Produces Copper Alloys
S.I.C.: 3366
Louis C. Begg *(Pres.-Europe)*

Ampco S.A. **(1)**
Rue Claude-Bernard, B.P. 2...
Maurepas Cedex France
Tel.: 011-31-34-801-3636

Buffalo Forge S.A. de C.V. **(1)**
Apartado Postal 34-032, Tepe...
Mexico, D.F. Mexico
Tel.: 905-565-9933
Emp: 208
Air & Liquid Handling, Conditioning & Control
S.I.C.: 3625
Peter H. Florence *(V.P. & G.M.)*

Canadian Blower/Canada F... **(1)**
90 Woodside Ave. Kitchener On...
Canada N2G 4K1
Tel.: 519-744-8111
Emp: 400
Sub. of Buffalo Forge Co
S.I.C.: 3564
Douglas G. McKenzie *(Pres.)*

Cleveland Tramrail Internat... **(1)**
3-5, Place Winston Churchill L-...
Luxembourg Luxembourg
Sub. of Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp.
S.I.C.: 3536
John Goodwin *(G.M.)*

Union Electric Steel N.V. **(1)**
Industrie Park B-3980 Tessender...
Belgium
Tel.: 011-32-13-661711
Sub. of Union Electric Steel Corp.
S.I.C.: 3325
J. M. Westen *(V.P. & Gen. Mgr.)*

AMSCO, AMERICAN STERILIZER COMPANY
2222 W. Grandview Blvd., ...
PA 16514
Tel.: 814-452-3100
Approx. Sls.: $250,000,00...
Emp: 3,520
Fiscal Year-end: 12/31/86
Design & Mfr. Equip. & Re... Supplies Used in Hospitals, ... Labs. & Other Indus. & Com... Concerns
S.I.C.: 3842
Henry E. Fish *(Chm. Bd & Chief Officer)*
B. J. Walker *(Pres. & Chief Oper. Officer)*
Frank Defazio *(Sr. V.P.-Fin.)*
James A. Nally *(Sr. V.P. Mktg. & Medical Prods.)*
Edwin Bindseil *(V.P.-Research & Devel.)*
T. L. Randles *(V.P.-Human ...*

KNU attitudes towards those activities, and a projection of when their operating in concert with SLORC, the

PROPOSAL

pose: To establish a vehicle in two phases whose utility orably positions commercial fishing interests for responsible loitation of waters in the Andaman sea contiguous to the Karen Mon states of Burma. The procedures outlined in this ument, once effectuated, shall serve in lieu of a formal tract, and can be regarded as a licence, de Jure and de facto, extract fish and related marine products from waters trolled by the Karen National Union.

PLAN

SE I

se one shall be an initial survey period during which the ponsible business interest(s) deemed suitable by mutual accord ween The KNU or their duly appointed representatives and the mercial interest themselves or other suitable entity will ropriate US $50,000.00 (US fifty thousand) to establish the en Fisheries Information Office.

is recommended that an escrow account be immediately ablished containing the $50,000.00. These monies are to be bursed to the KNU upon a meeting of the principals and/or ir representatives, establishment of general accord, and a closure of relevant bona-fides. Phase One shall be considered rational upon reciept of the US $100,000.00. It is understood t this office shall initially provide services of a nature erally described as "consultative". It is understood that ablishment of this office will contribute to priority status post- regime grants generally described as "concessionary" to advantage of those who undewrite this office now. This office ld provide information for Phase II.

s office would provide the following information:

(1) Types of primary marine products available.

(2) Identification of those who will assume power, and rently possess authority to grant fishing rights and enforce ne, what their roles will be and why.

(3) How to access those who will assume power.

(4) A summary of those aras in the Andaman sea cessible at present through the office established, and stinction drawn against those which are not, and why.

(5) An evaluation of KNU attitudes towards those rporations currently operating in concert with SLORC, the ture of their activities, and a projection of when their

contracts will be abrogated and apportioned to new interests, or renegotiated and why.

(6) Analysis of which areas of endeavor are likely to prove the most cost-effective and stable for the investor, taking into account relevant conditions existing and projected to exist in a locale-intensive geopolitical context as well as resource and manpower availability and reliability.

(7) A presentation of options and methods to be employed facilitating the near-term insertion of mutually acceptable, qualified resource survey personell for the purpose of on-site verification of marine resource availability and evaluation of marine resource extraction potential.

PHASE II

Phase II shall be the establishment of links between the corporate interest(s) and persons of expertise who will assume relevant authority to accomodate specific businesses, on a case by case basis, in Burma and waters controlled by the KNU itself. Phase II shall also facilitate the forging of links between corporate interests and those who will assume the mantle of general power on national and regional levels. Phase II can become operational concurrently with Phase I.

It is understood that in the course of operation of the office established in Phase I, certain valuable persons of authority will be approached and agreements likely entered into. Agreements of a business nature negotiated and entered into under the aegis of this office shall be understood as binding subsequent to a change of goverment in Burma. In certain cases, agreements of a business nature negotiated and entered into under the aegis of this office may be effectuated forthwith, and shall be understood as binding prior to, during, and after a change of government in Burma. Fishing may begin, at the discretion of those who underwrite this office, at any time.

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-- 100% secure." .. win said,

BURMESE BRUTALITY ENDORSED BY AMERICAN INVESTMENT

Last year the military led government in Burma permitted free democratic elections to take place. The peaceful pro-democracy movement won the election, but instead of bringing freedom to the people, the elections triggered a horrifying military backlash. The military of Burma has one of the world's worst human rights records, which has continued with the help of some new silent partners: international oil corporations.

Ten international oil companies have invested ir Burma's future oil deposits; two of them American. They have begun oil exploration under contract with the ruling military government. The two American companies are Amoco and Unocal. An Amoco spokesman justified their involvement in Burma by saying that oil companies must "go where the reserves or prospective basins are."

But where they think the oil is, lies in the northern Chindwin Basin. That is only a few hundred miles from the Kachin rebel insurgents. The Kachins have been called one of the best guerilla armies in the world. Logically security would be a major concern for any large seismic exploration in such a location. The Amoco spokesman explained that "there is a Burmese military presence in the area", but the military is, "not providing security for Amoco."

However, several Burmese insiders have claimed otherwise. Our reporter, Richard Ward checked with Mr. Soe Win, First Secretary of the Embassy of Burma, in Washington. Mr. Win said that the Amoco concession in the Northern Chindwin Basin was safe from the Kachin insurgents. As guests of the Burmese government, Amoco is provided with every protection by the Burmese military. Win said, "It (the Amoco installation) is 100% secure." Even their

transportation is dependent on the Burmese military. Win said, " They wouldn't be able to get around without us."

Use of the military for security is not so much a legal transgression as an ethical one. Amnesty International has compiled a report on the human rights abuses of the Burmese military. These abuses include the use of porterage, or forced labor for the Army. Burmese citizens, some as young as fourteen, and political dissidents are taken by force to areas of the country where the army is engaged with rebel insurgents. They are forced to carry military supplies and weaponry at gunpoint. They are not given shelter or even adequate food or clothing. When these porters are too weak to continue, they are routinely shot. The reasoning given for the executions is that if these human slaves are left behind alive they might report the army's whereabouts to the rebel insurgents.

The most alarming recent development has been a stockpiling of modern weapons. The government has just made a billion dollar arms deal with China for planes, tanks and other weapons. In addition, they have been amassing chemical weapons. The State Department has included Burma on their list of countries with chemical weapons to watch. The government of Burma has no dispute with any other nation in their region. The logical expectation of the use of these chemical weapons is that they intend to use them on their own people.

Senators Moynihan and Simms have passed legislation in the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 which requires the President to impose trade sanctions on Burma if they don't relinquish power to the elected party. The latest statements out of the Burmese government indicate that they will not turn over political control,

because they say there is no political group responsible enough to takeover. The Bush administration has taken no action. However, even if strict trade sanctions are imposed it will probably not affect oil exploration within the nation's borders.

ATT. MEG THOMPSON

revised 2nd page of J.V. proposal

w/ new foundation

From: G Pittaway

NRIIA PROGRAM PROPOSAL: BURMA 1989/90

PROJECT TITLE: **BURMESE JUNGLE UNIVERSITY**

PROJECT SUMMARY:

The NRIIA seeks to assist the pro-democracy forces in exile through a leadership training program for the Burmese student leaders. Utilising personnel and materials from the United States and around the world, NRIIA would run a program through the Foundation for Democracy in Burma which would entail eight focused, practical skills training seminars to be presented on-site in the camps. The purpose would be to finish the seminars in advance of the Burmese elections scheduled for May 1990.

Background:

In the spring of 1988, the Burmese students took to the streets in support of a change in government and for a democratic system with private enterprise encouraged to revive the economy. By July of 1988, the student movement had grown into a general uprising which included workers, monks, shopkeepers, and even government workers. Civil disobedience and strikes paralyzed the economy and brought about the collapse of the socialist military regime.

There were no defined programs or leaders to take advantage of the change in the government and to bring about elections or new policies. The military then had the time to reorganize and resume power after a brutal military crackdown in Spetember.

The students along with other elements of the dissidents retreated to the jungle borders of Thailand in order to escape arrest and execution. The political opposition which was left in Burma was eventually silenced through house arrest as well as persecution. An underground communications network still links the dissidents in the jungle with the opposition in country.

The government claims that the elections in May will be free and fair. If so and if the opposition wins, which it is projected to do if the elections are free and fair, the new leadership will come from the dissidents in the jungle. These individuals have a rudimentary knowledge of democracy and want to learn more so that they can provide an alternative to the current government. If the elections are not free and fair, the consensus is that the corrupt military regime which is implementing arbitrary arrest, torture, and summary executions cannot last much longer regardless of the elections.

Since the prevailing view is that the May elections will constitute a watershed beyond which the regime either leaves after losing the election, abdicates or its rule is limited to a very short term, the NRIIA program is geared to the next five months. The purpose will be to prepare the future leaders as much as possible in the limited time period available.

PROPOSED GRANTEE:

NRIIA would administer the grant through the Foundation for Democracy in Burma, a philanthropic organization established to promote peace, prosperity, and the exercise of basic human rights among all people in Burma through democratic means. ALthough the NRIIA does not usually work through an American based grantee, it is felt that due to the situation in Burma itself, it will be more effective and provide greater grant control by working with the foundation.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES:

The objectives of this program are:

1.To increase the knowledge of democratic systems to the future potential leaders of a democratic Burma.

2.To aid the democratic forces in Burma in understanding the fundamentals of running a democratic government.

3.To foster the development of moderate democratic youth and intelligentsia who are in exile in the jungle camps.

These objectives all stem from the prevailing attitudes among the dissidents who have been inspired by the democratic, free market system in the United States which they demostrated during the uprisings in Burma last year.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Location: Te Baw Bo Camp or Three Pagoda Pass (final site selection to be made by in-country coordinator).

What Will Be Done:

A. The NRIIA will support the administration of the program.

B. Eight three-day seminars will presented on site by specialists recruited by NRIIA from around the world. The seminars would offer open lectures, films, videos and discussions to all in the camps as well as smaller closed seminars for the recognized student leaders. Topics would

include: leadership dynamics; procedures of democratic party building; how to organize and conduct a free election; comparative constitutional/federal systems; non-violent strategies and techniques; media relations; rights and roles of minorities in democratic systems; and the art of negotiation and the utility of compromise.

Participants: Staff of the Foundation for Democracy in Burma; international specialists in democratic systems, organization, election processes, and non-violent opposition; students and other dissidents located in the jungle camps.

How: A grant will be made from the NRIIA to the Foundation for Democracy in Burma upon approval by the Agency for International Development.

When: The period of the proposed grant is from 15 December 1989 to June 15, 1990.

Other Support: This program will not receive other support from the Foundation although the Foundation does seek additional assistance for the other programs it administers. These projects and other funding will not contradict the purposes of the NRIIA grant.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS AND EVALUATION:

The NRIIA expects this program to fulfill all proposed ends.

The primary goal is, in a very limited time-frame, to aid the dissidents in their understanding of democracy and in their ability to participate and create a democratic form of government in Burma if they are given the opportunity either because of the elections in May or because of the aftermath of the elections. It is a unique opportunity to directly assist individuals who have risked everything, including their lives, to pursue through non-violent means their belief in a free and fair democratic government.

The program will be monitored according to NRIIA standards for liaison and reporting as stated in the grant agreement. Monthly, mid-term, and final financial and programmmatic reports will be required of the Foundation. NRIIA staff will visit the Jungle University to review the program.

BUDGET FOR FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

The proposed support grant to the fopundation shall be for the period December 15, 1989 to June 15, 1990 for a total of **$110,406.00**

SALARIES		30,000.00
In-country program coordinator ($2500 x 6 months)	15,000	
U.S. program coordinator ($2500 x 6 months)	15,000	
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT		
Texts, printed matter, computer		14,000.00
COMMUNICATIONS		
Telephone, telex, fax, postage		2,800.00
TRAVEL AND PER DIEM		28,956.00
Consultants and staff travel		
RT airfare to Thai/Burma Border 12 trips x 1550	18,600	
Per Diem not to exceed $117		
8 x 6 days x 117	5,616	
1 x 20 days x 117	2,340	
Car Rental 8 x 3 days x 50	1,200	
Drivers 8 x 3 days x 50	1,200	
		30,250.00
CONSULTANTS		
8 International specialists to conduct the seminars		
6 @ 275 per day x 15 days	24,750	
2 @ 275 per day x 10 days	5,500	
		4,400.00
OTHER DIRECT COSTS		
Cost of seminars 8 x 550		
TOTAL		$ 110,406.00

Considering the Jungle University:

In terms of justification and urgency, when considering aid to these students it is important that reviewers understand:

1. That the student led uprising in Burma was a product of and a reflection on the success of the Reagan revolution. Demonstrations were focused regularly at the gates of the US Embassy. Socialism and dictatorship were reviled and rejected while democratic, free-market principles were proclaimed. The opportunity here is not to establish, but to consolidate US moral leadership.

2. The anachronistic, discredited regime cannot possibly endure. Reports of arbitrary arrest, torture, summary executions, death-marches and other gross violations of human rights are reaching the outside world with increasing frequency and reliability. The international consensus that this regime is unacceptable is solidifying. The ethnic resistance forces enjoy growing international legitimacy and improved battlefield performance. Though demonstrably bogus, the May elections can be predicted to constitute a watershed beyond which the regime either abdicates, or external and internal pressures - along with its inherent weakness - combine to number its days to few. The NRI/JU addresses this window of opportunity with a practical program deliverable in time allowed.

Jungle University; The Grantee:

The grant would be administered through the Foundation for Democracy in Burma (see att.2), a philanthropic organization established to promote peace, prosperity and the excercise of basic human rights among all peoples in Burma through democratic means; and to advance public knowledge of and interest in Burma and Burmese affairs.

Jungle University; The Program:

The program would focus on eight key modules to be presented on-site by specialists resoursed by NRI/JU. Specialists would be expected to remain on site 3-5 days and offer "open" lectures, films, videos etc, available to anyone in the camp as well as "closed" seminars and presentations directed toward recognized student and intellectual leaders. Modules would include:

1. Leadership Dynamics
2. Proceedures of Democratic Party Building
3. How to Organize and Conduct a Free Election
4. Comparative Constitutional/Federal Systems
5. Non-Violent Stratigies and Tactics
6. Media Relations
7. Rights and Roles of Minorities in a Free Society
8. The Art of Negotiation and the Utility of Compromise

...U Nu?

...sh Broadcasting Servic...

The Burmese military régime has issued on April 1, 1991 a directive for all government workers and armed forces personnel to answer a questionaire comprising 33 questions.

Burma observers said the latest attempt of the ruling military régime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc), clearly forced government servants and armed forces personnel alike into a dilemma of choosing one's conscience and occupation. They are required to give their full identity in answering the questionaire. The junta might use the result of the poll answered by workers under duress to outrightly humiliate the leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and for the military to cling to power. The NLD has won the May 27, 1991 elections overwhelmingly.

According to the directive signed by U Soe Tint, secretary of the government, Chairman of the Slorc, General Saw Maung, said in last February at a coordinating meeting of the Slorc and members of the State and Division Law and Order Restoration Councils that morale of the people must be changed. Speaking at a meeting with the final year students of the Union Nationalities Development Institute, he pointed out that people were involved in politics before for the independence of the country but they were interested in the party- rather than national-politics after the independence. "When the Revolutionary Council came to power it has stroven for the unity. As Burma is a free country, there is no need for the government workers to be involved in politics," he was quoted as saying by the directive.

Government workers were repeatedly warned to be clear from politics and they have also signed their commitments to refrain from it, the directive said adding that if they were found still engaging in politics they will be removed from work without any further investigation.

The directive reiterated the need for the workers at various levels to stay away from political parties and not to discuss politics at work. They are required to sign that they understand the directives.

The repeated directives meant that right spirit develops in the minds of the government workers who would then strive for toward the benefit of the country and people, it said.

In order to survey the unwavering loyalty of the workers, they were instructed to answer the questionaire individually.

Copies of the questionaires to be sent back to the office of the Slorc by April 30 the latest must be kept at respective ministries under confidential procedures.

Questionaire includes:

1. Do you want the reins of insurgent groups such as Kachin Independence Organization, Karen National Union, All Burma Students Democratic Front, New Mon State Party?
2. Do you wish or support the under ground units of the Burma Communist Party?
3. Do you accept the rule of Burma by a foreign country?
4. Do you accept the inteferance in Burma of the Central Intelligence Agency?
5. Do you support the reins of the government of Exile Sein Win?
6. Do you support the reins of the parallel government of U Nu?
7. Do you support the broadcasts of British Broadcasting Service, Voice of America and All India Radio?

9. Do you support U Tin Oo, Daw (Aung San) Suu Kyi, U Kyi Maung, U Chit Khaing, leaders of the National League for Democracy?

10. Do you support exiles such as Sein Win, Peter Lin Pin, Maung Aung and U Sein Mya?

11. Do you wish the revival of the 1988 uprisings?

12. Do you wish the control of the state by the army before a stable constitution is drawn?

13. Do you accept that all citizens are responsible to have a stable constitution?

14. Do you accept the fact that all government workers must be clear of party-politics?

15. Explain if you cannot accept it!

16. Were you a member of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP)?

17. Mention your party member number if you were a BSPP member!

18. Mention your duty of the party!

19. The government has already issued directives all government workers must be clear of party-politics and if not they will be punished. Do you know that?

20. Do you know that government workers will be sacked if they do not obey workers' rules and regulations?

21. What is your main duty?

22. Was the army biased in the last elections?

23. How long does it take to change a system for the long term benefit of the state?

24. Which ~~one is the~~ institution ~~that~~ can realize the peaceful and stable country?

25. Which system will be the best for Burma?

26. How should the head of state (President) be chosen? (a) Direct choice by the people (b) step by step (through township, division, central) (c) chosen from among the parliamentary representatives (d) not a parliamentary representative but a suitable person chosen by the parliament

27. Should a person married to a foreigner be chosen as head of state?

28. If so, what can happen to the state?

29. What kind of punishment should be given to a person who has beheaded others, destroyed state property and attempted to divided the army?

30. Between an individual and a state, which must be given preferance?

31. For whose benefit is today's army executing state affairs?

32. How should the army regard the organizations which consider it as their enemy?

33. Should one practise direct confrontations against the army?

ATTN: Meg Thompson

Burma Election Observer Proposal (draft)

Executive Summary

On a yet unspecified date in May 1990, elections are to be held in the Union of Burma (Myanmar). Refrence to the attached documents will give some indication of the rising concern among Burma watchers, within the Burmese opposition, and in the US Congress about the fairness and legitimacy of these elections.

It is proposed here that provision be made for observer delegations representing recognized democratic parties and institutions to be sent to Burma to evaluate and report on the conduct of this critical election.

Background

In the spring of 1988, pressures and frustrations which had been building for decades began to erupt into the streets of Rangoon, capital of Burma; a war-torn, misruled, mismanaged nation of 40 million weged between India, China and Thailand. By July of that year conditions reached the flashpoint of a general uprising with students, workers, shopkeepers, clergy and even government functionaries engaging in massive, protracted civil disobedience and strikes that paralyzed the country and brought about the apparent collapse of the detested military regime.

This mass outpouring of rage and hope focused on the gates of the US Embassy where demonstrations demanding economic reform and free elections regularly took place. Tragically, the legacy of 40 years of doctrinaire one-party socialism and brutal military repression, along with the swiftness of its advent left this movement without established leaders or clear alternative programs and goals. The inevitable drift toward anarchy allowed hard-liners in the regime to regroup and consolidate enough support in the military to mount a ruthless and brutal crackdown, shooting thousands of unarmed citizens in the streets.

Faced with the sullen, seething resentment of the general population, confronted with increasing losses in the protracted civil-war against Burma's ethnic minorities, and met with progressive political and economic isolation in the international arena, the regime scheduled the May elections in a demonstrably cynical attempt to capture a fig-leaf of legitimacy. As the attachments show, this "carrot" was offered to the people of Burma accompanied by the "stick" of mass repression, the extent of which has shocked and mobilized democratic interests worldwide.

Though it is impossible to expect anything approaching a fair and free expression of the will of all the people of Burma, the May elections represent a watershed in the historical and political development of Burma. The provision of qualified observers will provide a vehicle for constructive and substantative international input into this process and will send a vital message of support and concern to the emerging democratic opposition forces as well as to the regime itself.

Rationale and Approach

The mere fact of organizing to send observers to Burma will put the regime on notice that the world's democracies are aware of and sympathetic to the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people and will hold the regime to reasonable standards of performance and accountability in the conduct of the election.

It can be expected that the regime will be resistant to this process, but final rejection of observers is by no means a foregone conclusion. Initiating the observer project creates an issue and a set of agenda items to which the regime must respond in some fashion. This sets a framework either for dialogue, or the exchange of diplomatic signals, and the longer the lead time, the more opportunity there is for this process to bear fruit. It is thus important to begin this process as soon as practicable.

The provision of observers would both encourage and enhance Burma's democratic opposition. Direct and indirect contact with opposition elements would assist them in their quest for domestic legitimacy and put them in dialogue with persons and groups conversant with electoral process, something 40 years of isolationist one-party rule has regretably not permitted.

Mez:

Were Running off. Will
call late today/tomorrow AM

Jon Sitting

NOTES ON BURMA'S ONSHORE OIL CONCESSIONS (DRAFT)

In November of 1989, oil companies from around the globe concluded oil concession agreements with the military government in Rangoon. Presumably the companies asessed in detail the risks they are taking investing in the future of an unstable nation, and found those risks to be within acceptable tolerance. It can also be assumed that they relied heavily on the services of blue chip risk analasis companies and individuals to make decisions on investment strategy. We are sure that they also recieved assurances by the military regime in Rangoon that their investments will be safe.

It should be noted, however, that Burma is a land that does not give up her secrets easily- indeed, precious little is understood about what makes this enigma "tick" outside of Rangoon- a self-serving condition engineered by the regime itself.

The oil companies: Amoco, Unical (U.S.), Idemitsu (Japan) BXPP (Aus.), Royal Dutch Shell, Yukong LTD (S. Korea), Croft Exploration, Kirkland Resources (Gr. Britain), and Petro Canada.

WHAT THE OIL COMPANIES SHOULD KNOW, BUT PRESUMABLY DON'T

1. The think tanks and foundations are behind the intelligence/policy curve with respect to Burma. For example, US policy has changed in the dead of night, spearheaded by very few individuals without fanfare, rendering much of the think tank analyses and conventional wisdom on Burma obsolete. And the US, despite its decline in influence in the region, will nevertheless play a leading role on the issue of Burma policy worldwide, having already occupied the moral high ground on the issue.

2. None of the oil companies know how much or how little economic autonomy will be granted, constitutionally speaking, to the minorities whose oil and goodwill they covet. be involved in the drafting of an alternative constitution which may serve as a blueprint for the eventual government structure.

3. The oil companies may not realize that the election scheduled for 27 May 1990, which the regime has organized as a deliberate sham, may actually open Pandora's box, setting in motion a chain of events which will prove extremely uncomfortable for the regime and the oil companies.

4. The oil companies do not know which of the persons or groups with whom they are negotiating will survive a shakeout, or when this shakeout may occur.

5. None of the Oil companies know which of the opposition groups are recieving advice on abrogation of oil concessions, or from whom and why they are recieving this advice, good or bad.

6. The oil companies do not know the identities of the persons responsible for planning fifth column activities against them and the regime, the details of these plans, or whether or not their range effectively extends into areas contracted for exploration.

7. The oil companies do not know whom, if any, of their competitors are already hedging with the opposition, casting an eye towards gaining favor in the future.

8. Oil intrests should note that upwards of sixty percent of the Burmese economy, black market included, is in "rebel" hands. The resistance population is well versed in and operating under free market principles, unlike the regime, which does not understand these principles.

9. Oil companies should note that a demoralized Burmese army is sustaining a verifiable 8-to-1 casualty rate on the battlefield vs. the armed resistance. This is the same Burmese army that is supposed to maintain security for oil personel in the areas of exploration. Oil companies are also unaware as to why this lopsided situation exists, how we aquire this information and why we know it is reliable. Pow's released by rebels are segregated from their comrades, imprisoned

10. The actual "language" in the foreign aid to the Rebel students appropriated by congress may be significantly different from that which would indicate a desire to merely supply humanitarian assistance. Close inspection of this language indicates a reorientation of policy which endorses onsite political/ tactical training for the express purpose of opposing the current regime- a far cry from just providing rice and band aids. We have been selected to implement this distinction onsite.

11. If the oil companies are currently recieving counsel on the above, it is likely inaccurate advice. This is because we are in front of the curve on Burma policy and therefore on the fallout that that policy inevitably will have on the fate of the regime in Rangoon. More importantly, we are a causal force in bringing about these fundamental changes rather than just observers or readers of the tea leaves. And we detect and are told that there is no one else in the rather small loop on this curve, where the current action is- in Washington.

-The armed resistance has compelling incentive to harrass and disrupt oil operations-

1. The oil investment capital is funneled into military applications which fuels Burmese offensives against them.

2. The civil war has taken place in a publicity vaccuum, wherein the Rangoon party line concerning the conduct of the war and their battlefield progress is slanted to bolster the Rangoon contention that they can provide security for the oil companies. In reality, their ability to prevent harrassment of oil operations by the armed resistance is questionable, as they have

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tried but failed to provide security in logging operations.

But the succesful effort to disrupt logging is viewed by the resistance as small potatoes in comparison with oil. Since so little is known about armed resistance successes, the resistance is presented with a golden oportunity to demonstrate their range of operation to the outside world by disrupting the oil companies activities. As a result, the oil companies could unwittingly serve as their mouthpiece, providing the armed resistance with a "Tet Offensive" type victory. But unlike "Tet", Rangoon actually has no chance of ever overcoming the resistance forces.

3. They are further inclined to disrupt operations because the Burmese army is ALREADY throwing everything it has at them. They literally have nothing to fear in terms of reprisal.

4. The oil companies, by operating in specific areas, are inadvertantly pointing out the resistance's military targets by indicating the intrinsinc value of the objective.

5. The armed resistance has reason to dbout the viability of any plan which entails the oil companies earmarking support for Burmese military operations to protect oil investment. International approbrium against the oil companies would be too great to justify direct support, and the prospect of successfully supporting the military in secret is unlikely. In addition, this tactic would simply serve to raise the net cost of oil extraction while guaranteeing nothing.

The bottom line is the oil companies are signing deals with people who may barely escape Burma with their lives 18 months from now. In their place could be empowered people who are already talking abrogation. We can discreetly act as a liason between the oil companies and the opposition, and influence the opposition to moderate their reprisal oriented positions. Indeed, we feel such a liason is vital when seen in light of the fact that the Karen army is in effect already "abrogating" Rangoon's foreign logging concessions by shooting the loggers. The Karens do this because they percieve logging operations, with some justification, as a military threat. There is little to indicate that the resistance will exempt the oil companies from the same perception.

But pumping oil and logging are endeavors which operate under different dynamics- a distinction which is lost on the resistance/ opposition. For example, abrogation of oil concessions entails a loss of valuable research information. We are certain that the opposition will listen to us in the case of the oil, because they are now convinced that we have a finger on the pulse of the issue, and a have their best interests at heart. In any event, we are already fully functional in this advisory capacity with the exile groups and the Minorities, and in turn, the internal Burman opposition.

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3. They are further inclined to disrupt operations because the Burmese army is ALREADY throwing everything it has at them. They literally have nothing to fear in terms of reprisal.

4. The oil companies, by operating in specific areas, are inadvertantly pointing out the resistance's military targets by indicating the intrinsinc value of the objective.

5. The armed resistance has reason to dbout the viability of any plan which entails the oil companies earmarking support for Burmese military operations to protect oil investment. International approbrium against the oil companies would be too great to justify direct support, and the prospect of successfully supporting the military in secret is unlikely. In addition, this tactic would simply serve to raise the net cost of oil extraction while guaranteeing nothing.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF THAI ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIEF TO REFUGEE STUDENTS ON THE THAI--BURMESE BORDER

BACKGROUND

In December of 1988, the supreme commander of the Thai armed forces, general Chavalit, travelled to Rangoon for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations and business ties with the Saw Maung regime. This raised something of a hue and cry among others within the Thai elite- many of whom believe Saw Maung's days are numbered and passively support the Burmese opposition. Though cracks are beginning to appear in his teflon over this, Chavalit prevails, and is a factor to be reckoned with.

Question: How does one address and placate Thai sensitivities without killing any aid package?

1. All plans to assist the Burmese students must be made in light of how Chavalit will percieve them.

2. If even a farfetched case can be made that a given component of the aid project does'nt run counter to his interests, it is a good component.

3. If such a case is not being made, it is either (a.), a bad component or (b.), isn't being presented "creatively".

Question: Any suggestions on how nos. 1,2 & 3 above might be kept track of and explained?

This may require an on the scene point man who can act as a liason to the Thais for the purpose of presenting each move in the best possible light. Indeed, He/she should make sure that any sympathetic Thais who may naturally gravitate towards the aid "action" are never left without predigested alibis and realistic sounding strategic justification for any assistance they might render.

Question: Who should know about the concept of the Jungle University? Do we rush out, call a press conference, then solicit donations?

In order for the project to advance all parties may need to excercise extreme discretion and avoid publicising the Jungle University concept at least for the forseeable future. I do not dbout for example, we may encounter the suggestion that this "University" and rumors of rice could trigger a mass exodus of

disgruntled from Burma's interior towards the camps, thus creating an untenable refugee situation on yet another Thai border. Thailand, justifiably, would be unwilling to countenence this scenario.

Question: How do you address this concern?

Instead, the case should be made that this "magnet" effect would in reality draw Burmese students from INSIDE Thailand back into the camps where some Thais say they belong. General Chavalit does not appreciate Burmese students in Bangkok calling press conferences to denounce his business partner Saw Maung, etc.- so support for the jungle university and aid in the form of food, clothing, etc. is part of the solution, not part of the problem.

Question: Where are the student camps? Can we get aid to them without attracting too much attention?

The flow of goods across the Thai -Burma fronteir runs along a time worn path. The camps, not surprisingly lie in close proximity to these ancient commercial trails, and in terms of access, there is no need to re-invent the wheel in any attempt to transit relief supplies to the students. Indeed, much of the flow of aid into the camps can easily be construed by an onlooker as just one more shipment across a busy black market border- a black market encouraged by and profited from by Thailand.

Question: Do we box up all the relief supplies and ship them out of the USA to Bangkok, then tranship to the border?

The more of the aid materiel purchased onsite, near the border, the better the relations with the local Thais should be- they will have a vested interest in the program.

Question: How do we find the Thai suppliers who best suit our needs?

Influential, High ranking Thais might be given a supply list, then solicited for their "suggestions" on possible vendors. That the vendor may turn out to be his brother in law should not be viewed in the perjorative sense...; it is simply "the way"- a time honored perogative of officials who are underpaid to begin with- and a practice which Americans sometimes ignore to their detriment. If there is a premium exacted, it will not be excessive- and given the sensitive nature of this enterprise, probably unavoidable.

Question: How can we be sure that relief supplies meant for the students do not fall into the hands of the armed resistance?

...e armed ethnic resistance forces who control the territories ...n which the students are encamped are by nature a proud and independent people. The students have been guests in their territories and as per tradition have been welcome to the share the armed resistance's meagre supplies. It not only defies this cultural tradition for the resistance to request payback, it also runs counter to their practical interests- they realise that any attempt to thwart stated conditions of U S policy and the aid it brings would hamsting their image and engender approbrium on the part of the Thais, upon whose territory they must operate from time to time.

Question: Can we get a commitment on this?

A written commitment to this effect can be elicited from the commanders of the resistance. It would be handled best by someone conversant with their modus operendi as this is a delicate request and may be construed as an affront to their pride. They will probably reply in writing that any aid will in fact increase the net amount of rice available to their troops and civilians in the area, as the students will be that much less dependent on insurgent largesse. So they will accrue in effect a "rice windfall" and will have no incentive to filch from the students. This could be construed as passive American aid to the insurgents, but in reality it only brings the insurgents back to square one, where they were before the uprising, which was hardly an enviable state of affairs to begin with.

Question: What do the students really want in terms of educational subject matter, and why?

The students want to continue along basic tracks taught at Rangoon U., insofar as is practical. They also need training in tropical hygine, practical Thai and English language. But a political science/ leadership training module as part of a relief strategy could spell the difference between another bloody outbreak of frustrated rage in the streets and a realatively peacable transition of power. What the students lack are the very skills that institutions such as NED/NRI/NDI can impart- and no one knows this better than the students themselves.

This is understandable since there is little tradition of the democratic process, indeed, the population has been systematically indoctrinated in the mechanics of a discredited system of government to the exclusion of all other systyems of government or nonviolent political strategies. It would be unfortunate if a frustrated opposition, lacking the skills required to effectivly vent their political energy discreetly or even unify themselves, encountered the extreme violence any unsophisticated attempt to air their grievences would engender.

Question: How might Thailand react to political strategy being taught in the camps?

We don't know, but Thailand could be told that instruction in non-violent methadology would serve to deter border tension by deflecting student energies away from thoughts of "violence". In addition, the nature of such instruction would suggest that aid in ALL forms was in transit to presumed non-belligerents.

Question: What if violence erupts anyway?

If violence should erupt again inside Burma there may well be, as there was in sept.'88, a window of opportunity wherein a confused military govenment seeks a way out of the crisis. If they are taught the skills to develop in advance of the crisis a clear agenda for transition, the pro-democratic movement may be seen as part of a solution rather than the cause of the problem- and broker a transition to the democratic inevitability.

Question: Are there any minorities represented in the student population?

One of the tragic results of the Burmese policy of discrimination against the minority groups in Burma has been the minorities difficulty in obtaining a university education. Since there are many dialects spoken in Burma the minorities have long known that any hope of furthering the education of their children past the High School level would require extensive training in the Burmese language. So they select their best and brightest and drill them relentlessly in the requisite technical subjects, which they master- in Burmese. They even change their names to indicate Burmese ancestery long before exam time. But this rarely works, because in the essay portion the applicant inevitably fails to dot one idiomatic i or cross a t- so they are identified as a member of a minority, and admittance is automatically denied.

Question: has anything been done about this state of affairs?

In hopes of overcoming this problem, the minorities have established clandestine boardinghouses in Rangoon, where they send a few bright prospects to sublimate their ethnicity through a process of total immersion in an alien Burmese culture. This has proven somewhat successful, but relentless anti-minority indoctrination has taken its toll even in the minds of these few students, who in essence become "Burmese".

Question: Since that apparently has not worked too well, what to do?

educational relief becomes a viable proposition, it is only that the minorities be allowed to send qualified applicants to attend- ideally in numerical proportion to their percentage of population in Burma as a whole, though I daresay even token attendence would incur tearful gratitude of entire populations in perpetuity. Of course, the minority applicants will be more than qualified, needing no special breaks.

Question: Would there be problems getting a few minority applicants into the student area?

If they are allowed to attend, I can forsee no diplomatic headaches that are not already incumbent upon the project, or logistical problems transporting a few minority students into the university area.

please distribute

Burmese Oil Options

The Burmese Government is expected to announce late this month or in October that it will allow three foreign firms to explore for oil onshore. The main area for exploration will be the upper Chindwin River basin and the country's de facto leader, Ne Win, will personally select these three companies. The US company Amoco, British Petroleum and Japanese interests are among the most likely candidates for the promised concessions. Amoco's



No Win.

special envoy, Daniel Rose, who died in July, had a personal relationship with Ne Win that dated back to the 1940s.

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
28 SEPTEMBER 1989

Coca-Cola to produce soft drinks in Burma

▶ Coca-Cola Corp. has agreed to cooperate with Myanma Foodstuffs Industries, a Burmese state-owned enterprise, to produce and market soft drinks, including Coca-Cola, in Burma. Notes were signed by the two firms during a recent visit to Rangoon by Stuart Eastwood, director of Coca-Cola Corp.'s Southeast and West Asian division.

Project Maje

*urgent: please send letters to the following corporation executives informing them that their investment in projects in Burma is completely inacceptable. Point out that tacit suport of one of the world's leading human rights abuse regimes is not only morally objectionable, it is bad public relations and it is short-sighted as the regime will not last. Include relevant info. about human rights, economy, political situation etc.

mr. Stuart Eastwood
Director, Southeast Asian Division
Coca-Cola Export Corp.
G.P.O. Box 523
Bangkok 10501, THAILAND
(Fax # 011-662-254-9910

send a copy to:

mr. Roberto Goizueta
Chief Executive Officer
Coca-Cola Inc.
310 North Ave. NW
Atlanta GA 30301
(Fax # 404-676-6792)

mr. Robert L. Blandon
President,
Europe, Latin America & Far East
Oil Exploration
AMOCO
501 Westlake Park Blvd.
Houston TX 77079
(Fax # 713-556-2139)

Send a copy to:

Mr. Richard R. M. Morrow
Chief Executive Officer
AMOCO
200 Ea. Randolph St.
Chicago IL 60601

FUNDAMENTALS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

The present situation in Burma is a result of poor leadership during the past 40 some odd years. Unable to unify the multi-ethic population, the leadership led the country in a 40 year-long civil war that does not appear to have an end. As a result, the economy has suffered to the extent that a once rich and prosperous nation has been reduced to a pauper nation, a once peaceful nation is fighting a deadly civil war that continues to brutally drain the very life blood of its youth, the nation's education has taken a step backwards as the Rangoon leadership closed down the schools and universities and dispersed the teachers and the students to the periphery of the nation in a wild frenzy of suppression and murder. There appears no end in sight as the central Burmese leadership continues to stoke the fires of repression, ranting and raving with threats of total annihilation, and launching massive assaults against the armed opposition and effectively silencing the unarmed aboveground opposition by arresting their leadership. Not wanting to interfere in internal affairs, western and eastern nations have done absolutely nothing to help other than some words condemning the human rights violations and partially halting aid to the Rangoon regime. Some foreign governments have gone all out to support "free and fair" elections and to support the suffering students and their demand for democracy while shunning all contact with the long-suffering freedom fighters who were the first to provide them with refuge.

The Democratic Alliance of Burma was formed by over 20 organizations representing a large cross-section of the people of Burma. Its position has been that peace must be restored before there can be a true change in government resulting in democracy and economic development. To put elections before peace is to put the cart before the horse. Those who support democracy must support an end to the civil war first. Only in an atmosphere of dialogue and discussion can peaceful change take place leading to free and fair elections and democracy.

Peace talks, negotiations, dialogue, discussion is not relevant only to those who have been in armed resistance for the past 40 years. Since it is the basis for further advancement on the road to democracy it is fundamentally an integral part of the process of democratization. The nation as a whole must be given the chance to support the peace process. Unfortunately, many people inside the country do not know or understand this basic premise of the NDF and DAB. By calling for elections before bringing an end to the civil war, some of the prodemocratic opposition have misled the people of Burma and the nations of the world. There cannot be and will not be free and fair elections without first bringing an end to the civil war.

There can only be free and fair elections where the people can gather as they please and the leadership of all the parties can speak openly and freely in a spirit of tolerance and acceptance. There has to be freedom to associate with whatever party one wishes. To talk of free and fair elections when the country is in a state of war and under the rule of the military is whimsical.

The time has come for our friends in foreign governments to recognize the role that the NDF and the DAB can and must play and to give their support to the cause of peace and freedom. Peace talks failed in the past because there was inadequate unity on the part of those fighting for their rights and an attempt was made to exploit the various groups singly. A piecemeal approach gave the central government the upper hand and left the belligerents without much room for negotiation. The NDF and the DAB are national umbrella organizations that represent a national interest and other than the central government represent the most significant party. The civil war in Burma can be brought to an end only when the central government in Rangoon is willing to sit down and talk with the DAB. To this end we call on all who love freedom and democracy to get behind the call for peace talks first. Only when there is peace and unity will we finally be able to get together to rebuild our families, towns, and nation, and restore the never-realized dream of democracy, and pursue the beckoning call of prosperity.

PRESENTATION TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NONVIOLENT SANCTIONS IN CONFLICT AND DEFENSE, BY U TIN MAUNG WIN, CAMBRIDGE, MA, 9 FEB 1990.

Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen. I am honored to have been asked to provide a status report on the progress of the pro-democracy movement in Burma and the role of nonviolent struggle in that movement.

Notice I mentioned that nonviolent struggle is a part of the pro-democracy movement. There are, in fact, several groups participating in the struggle to restore democracy in Burma who have either not yet accepted nonviolent action as the most effective means of gaining political power, or who have reverted to traditional forms of conflict when nonviolent action failed to meet their expectations.

For those of us who advocate nonviolent struggle, our tasks have been made more difficult by several events in the past two years. I will not recount them all here today. But I will hightlight those which impact directly on our ability to restore the momentum of our struggle and to wage an effective nonviolent campaign.

First, the Burmese government has killed, imprisoned or forced into exile the in-country leaders of the nonviolent movement. Those followers who have exhibited any leadership talent have also been singled out for intimidation. The intelligence apparatus of the Rangoon regime has repeatedly severed our communication links with the nonviolent groups in Rangoon, Mandalay and other towns. Aung San Suu Kyi, the most popular symbol of nonviolent struggle in Burma remains under house arrest. U Nu, the last freely elected leader in Burma, also is under house arrest. U Tin Oo, the Chairman of the National League for Democracy was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to three years hard labor. In short, the experienced cadre of nonviolent movement leaders has been segregated from their followers.

A second major problem confronting us and diverting us from our strategic plan for nonviolent action has been the unceasing bombardment and ground assaults against the refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border by the Burma Army. Long used as sanctuaries by ethnic minorities to escape the rape, pillage and plundering of Rangoon forces, these camps are now falling to enemy hands. Well fortified and unassailable from the Burma side of the border, they are now rountinely being assaulted by the Burma Army from inside Thailand. Our intention was to provide instruction on nonviolent action and techniques to the several thousand Burman students taking refuge with the Karens, Kachins and Mons. Graduates were to be guided back into Burma to serve as cadre to the in-country nonviolent leaders. Only a small percentage of these students have completed any significant training and been sent back into Burma. Much of their effort is required for mere physical survival. Food,

clothing and medical care are critically short, and frequent movements are required to avoid attacks by Burmese forces. Even more critical is the absence of any trained nonviolent strategists to assist us in getting the movement back on track and to develop a capability to function more effectively under existing conditions.

A third problem, that of political fragmentation, has been a Burmese characteristic throughout recorded history. Our inability to cooperate, coordinate and to "keep our eyes on the prize", that is, the restoration of democracy, cost our people dearly in 1988, when thousands were slaughtered in the streets of cities and towns all over Burma. I believe most of us learned our lesson. Since then, over 22 separate groups have joined together in the Democratic Alliance For Burma. The principal exile group promoting nonviolent struggle, the Committe For the Restoration of Democracy in Burma(CRDB) has as its priority mission the development of a world-wide solidarity of purpose through extensive coordination and consensus building.

In spite of these setbacks, which have served to strenghten our resolve, we are continuing to pursue nonviolent sanctions as our primary means of political struggle. Until we can reinforce the internal movement with trained nonviolent cadres, we are waging a strategic campaign where Saw Maung has major weaknesses.

-We are keeping world public and political leaders aware of the tragedy taking place in Burma. While we sincerely applaud the successes of nonviolent struggle in Eastern Europe, they have certainly reduced coverage on our struggle. It is my personal opinion that when future generations of Burmese read about this period in their history books, they will read the name of a foreigner who, armed with a typewriter and a clear sense of right and wrong, waged a one-man devastating assault against their oppressors. His name is Bertil Lintner, of the Far East Economic Review.

-We are seeking humanitarian aid for victims of the struggle. I learned only last week that AID officials are now interpreting restrictions on assistance to Burma to include those Burmese people who were forced to flee their homes and now living in exile along the Thai-Burma border. These Burmese are the victims of their government policies. They should not now also become victims of US policies whose original intent was to support their cause. Several groups, including the United Front for Burma, are attempting to sort out this bureacratic tangle to our favor.

-We are attempting to bring public and diplomatic pressure to bear on those governments and organizations assisting the Rangoon regime with financial and military support. I believe I speak for the Burmese citizens now suffering as a result of these business

transactions that when a democratic government is installed, it is quite likely contractual arrangements made with the Saw Maung government will reviewed for possible abrogation, and future business with these foreign firms will not be welcomed.

The people of Burma today do not have their freedom and they are, indeed, suffering. They have not, however, resigned themselves to live forever under tyranny. On the contrary, we all share in the joy that a virus, called democracy, is sweeping across the globe, and is devastating one tyranny after the other. No known cure exists. In the last decade, researchers have confirmed that this virus attacks oppressive regimes and that to avoid certain destruction, one must either accept a vaccine, that is, become democratic, or leave government. Researchers have also confirmed that the vector of democracy in this decade has increasingly been nonviolent struggle. What is even more remarkable about democracy today, is that every attempt to excise it from one part of society, has resulted in an infection of the entire body politic.

My assessment is that the murder, torture, and imprisonment of Burmese opposition leaders has rendered the entire Burmese population pro-democratic. Regrettably for General Saw Maung and his henchmen, they have repeatedly rejected offers to negotiate a political settlement to accommodate democratic reforms. They have left us with no alternative but to intensify the nonviolent struggle to remove all pillars of support and bring about the total isolation and destruction of the government of Burma. I can assure you that planning for this offensive is underway in coordination with groups inside Burma.

MEMO TO BOCA GROUP

Oct. 10 1990

The attatched is a partial compendium of press releases, statements, etc. released by opposition factions to the media, intelligence agencies, embassies, to broadcast services (VOA, BBC, All-India radio, etc. The set is by no means complete, but represents a cross-section of opposition viewpoints as perceived by the outside world. Most statements are logged in their entirety by wire services and editorial boards, the cumulative effect of which influences editorial posture to our benefit.

You may note that as a general rule, the later the release of the document, the less strident and more sophisticated the rhetoric becomes, and the better the english usage. This is necessarily a graduated process, since a sudden change in the tenor and presentation of opposition releases would indicate that an outside party had perhaps taken control of opposition policy apparatus. The statements directed at the Burma army are said to have significant impact on the army officers themselves. Central to our theme is the constant provision for a "way out" for the Burma armed forces. We wish to avoid backing the army into a corner, thus creating a siege mentality, while at the same time creating incentives for them in a future Burma. An unknown but significant number of officers are growing prone towards supporting our people as leaders in the future government as a result of this policy.

George Pittaway

PRIORITY: Please Forward

29 Nov. 1988
To: Charles Krohn
From: Jim Pittaway
Re: CRDB

Show to Win & Thu, as per their delayed request.

Dear Charles;

I arrived in Bangkok the morning of 19 November. George immediately informed me that a meeting was then taking place in Burma involving the NDF, CRDB and other groups. I am sure you have been informed of this meeting and its outcome, but I want to add my own impressions regarding this meeting, the status of the CRDB, and the current dynamics of the Burmese resistance.

As you may recall from our conversations I had three main areas of concern relative to the CRDB:

1. Are they credible with established resistance groups?
2. Are they too closely identified with U Nu?
3. Do they have a constituency inside Burma?

Though I still don't know the answer to the third question (I'll continue to check this out) the first two have been clearly answered in the affirmative.

Win and Thu have succeeded in insinuating themselves into key positions in this new entity, the Democratic Alliance of Burma. If I were you, I would report to my principles that this is a major success and not only does it justify continuing support, but such support is imperative given the opportunities Win's and Thu's positions entail and considering the manner they went about getting them.

First of all, the CRDB wears its Washington connection on its sleeve. It is clear from my conversation with Win and with KIO people that this - not the U Nu affiliation - is responsible for their status in the DAB. In a very important way, the NDF is saying "OK, Washington, we put your boys in, now let's see what you do for us". Given the suspicion common among such groups regarding Washington's reliability, the naming of Win and Thu should be seen as something of a challenge to Washington to put up or shut up. It is clear that the DAB can be abandoned or disbanded as easily as it was formed, but it is equally clear that DAB can, if it is effective, constitute the basis for whatever replaces the current regime in Rangoon. My recommendation would be to pull out all the stops and get behind these guys. My God! It must be worth a lot of money to someone just to have our people in key decision making posts in a group that militarily controls the Golden Triangle. Wake somebody up!

Another point of note is that both Win and my contacts in the KIO have made it clear that there is a de facto, but very effective, alliance between the CRDB and the KIO. (You and I can congratulate ourselves a little bit on this, it puts us in a very

Joan Vail
David Tell

Jim Cohen
Boca Raton, Fla.

Dear Jim;

I felt it might be worthwhile to augment the four way conversation of March 19 between you, Monte, Jim, and myself concerning drugs and security. Let me give you some basic examples of what the group might expect to hear from authorities in Washington.

Beginning with allegations of Kachin invovement in drugs: The DEA says that regardless of KIA policy sanctions against drug trafficking, (which are extreme) some soldiers in the KIA are involved. But to hold the KIA leadership responsible for the actions of a few is no different than holding the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the cocaine US soldiers are bringing in from Panama as they return from the invasion. And just as there is no move to throw U.S. forces out of, say, NATO for cocaine smuggling, there is no movement to expel the KIA from the DAB.

The KIO taxes land in the territories they control, including land upon which opium is grown, just as California taxes land in Humboldt county, including that which grows pot. This produces no great clamor to cease doing legitimate business with the state of California, or to expel it from the United States of America - appealing as that notion may seem to some.

On another side, there are many people, including missionaries (who are arguably the only ones in a position to really know) and the USA's most respected academic authority on the subject (Rutgers Prof. Joe Silverstein) who have flat denied ANY KIA INVOLVEMENT at any point in any way. They (among others, including many in the US government) say that it is the military regime in Rangoon who are the culprits.

The State Department recognizes the arguments above as essentially legitimate, and will tell you that it would be unfortunate and unnesscarry to allow the drug dynamic to serve as a prohibiting factor in our business plans. In fact, just the opposite may be true.

There is a popular theory afoot, to which we subscribe, which postulates that any enterprise which causes a dollar to be sent into the Burmese hinterland for a purpose other than drugs is an enterprise which Uncle Sam should get behind. I've got in front of me a Heritage Foundation report which specifically recommends US businessmen getting into the gem biz, as a good step in the war on drugs. The fact that peasants in the opium patch might see their cousins in the gem mines doing a little better financially than they were the day before has a positive effect in a grassroots way - the effective way. You

Tin Maung Win, General Secretary
Ye Kyaw Thu, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Democratic Alliance of Burma
Kler Camp,
Burma

Bangkok, Thailand
December 11, 1988

Dear Sirs;

Pursuant to our recent conversation, I would like to submit the following memorandum for your review. My intentions in this endeavor are to suggest an avenue along which certain difficulties of the DAB, both financial and logistical, can be relieved.

The focus of this document shall be a brief commentary on the student situation, because therin lies the basic portal through which aid can be obtained for your good efforts.

In a realistic assesment of the diplomatic sensitivity that pervades the relief predicament we are confined to certain limitations in the presentation of the students case. At issue is the percieved profile of the student as an armed combatant. Given the abuse the students have suffered at the hands of Rangoon it is understandable, probably commendable, that elements within thier ranks would vow to take up arms in the struggle. We may discover this vow was not made in vain... on the contrary... it could prove useful as a bargaining chip for aid .

If- for example- responsible, elected student leaders renounce violence as thier chosen means of opposing the Rangoon regime, reliable sources inform me that such action will be interpreted abroad as clear- headed movement in the"right" direction. It will provide donors with a signal to act and break the diplomatic deadlock that hampers serious assistance to your cause. The procedure required to activate this process is as follows:

1. A duly elected panel of student leaders would convene for the purpose of adopting a resolution embracing principles of non-violence in the struggle against the Rangoon regime.

2. A document would be drafted and ratified to this effect.

3. A copy of this document would be attatched to a cover letter formally requesting assistance both material and financial. Persona testimonials of hardship brought on by the regime and experienced by th students should also be attatched.

4. The cover letter and relevant documents would be forwarde the National Endowment for Democracy, an entity funded by the Congress the United States.

5. A task force will then be assembled by the NED and flowr suitable venue to meet with the authors of the documents, i.e., the st

6. The theme of the document would be reiterated in person by the student leaders in dialogue with the task force.

7. The student leaders would enumerate assistance requirements for the continuation of nonviolent civil opposition to the regime.

8. Funds and relief materiels of a non-lethal nature would be arranged for delivery.

- Relief materials suggested may include:

Food, Medical Supplies, Clothing, Teaching/ Learning aids for continuation of studies, Communications Equipment, Radio Station for broadcasting (with tech support), Building Materials, etc.

It is my belief that the above procedure could mark the beginning of real strategic assistance not only for the students, but for the DAB as well. And as far as I know, this assistance will be independent of the aid currently being provided by the UN and other relief agencies. But by initiating the above mentioned steps, you may also set in motion a condition that expedites delivery of help from ALL parties concerned.

It is our conjecture that the government of Thailand will not interfere with these procedures, since the case can be made that these efforts will serve to deter tensions by in fact deflecting student energies away from "violence". This should play well in the Thai media and parliament, by providing the Thais with an operational alibi while they "deal" with the regime . By endorsing or merely condoning these activities, Thailand can look Saw Maung in the eye and proclaim the non-belligerent status quo is being maintained. They won't have to mention that a student with a radio microphone, broadcasting from NDF/ DAB territory, is probably more effective fighting the regime than a student shooting at shadows in the jungle. I'm certain that you will agree that utmost sensitivity to the Thai's position in this regard is of primary importance to success.

Given the terms and conditions I have outlined above, I would be remiss if I did not say that these operational parameters are endorsed by basically good people who genuinely want to avoid loss of life among the student population. I believe that this plan might actually realise that aim for them, and provide them with a rationale for supporting the policies of the DAB in general, especially if you are percieved as patrons of this ideal.

I look forward to hearing your comments on these matters, and best of luck in your efforts to restore democracy in Burma.

Very Truly Yours,

George Pittaway
Swan Hotel Rm. 205
Bangkok, Thailand

CONFIDENTIAL

Joan Vail
Office of The President
Office of National Drug Control Policy
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

29 July 1990
Thai-Burma border

Dear Joan;

I hope all is well with you and yours. In reference to our meeting concerning Burma this March past, please find enclosed the recent policy statement of the Drug Enforcement Directorate (DED), a bureau of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). As you may recall, I promised to forward you any narcotics policy statements issued by pro-democracy groups in Burma.

I'd like to take this opportunity, if I may, to provide a bit of background on the rationale which precipitated the formation of the DED, and also to impart a biographical feel for a few of the players, who by circumstances of citizenship, credebility within the DAB, and contribution to the organizational structure of the DED would best be suited for liason purposes.

Notwithstanding the contention (a correct one, and another subject entirely), that lasting and truly fruitful solutions to the narcotic situation in Burma is contingent upon cessation of the civl war, national reconciliation, and the infrastructural development peace would engender, the DAB has identified a need to organize anti-narcotic policies along intelligence/ suppression/ interdiction models in the near term.

This is by and large because:

1) The DAB realizes that international narcotic control organizations (hereafter INCOS) such as the DEA will continue to operate intelligence/ suppression/ interdiction programs regardless of the state of internal affairs in Burma, and that these operations will likely intensify. Since the pursuit of policies conducive to a lessening of civil strife fall outside the perview of INCOS, the DAB identified the requirement for an apparatus whose organizational structure accomodates the methadologies employed by the INCOS.

2) The DAB realizes that even given internal peace, INCOS will play a significant role into the forseeable future.

3) The DAB believes that INCOS must sense that the mid-to-long (probably near) term power equation in Burma is unpredictable, and that it is concievable that persons with whom they establish rapport today could be gone tommorrow.

4) The DAB knows that should a true shakeout occur, a

ederal system would emerge, providing significant constitutional autonomy to the ethnic areas where cultivation occurs, and that;

5) The authority to effectively launch intelligence/ suppression/ interdiction programs will lawfully devolve, in large measure, upon the offices of those who now control the DAB and the DED.

6) The ethnic leaders possess inherent yet untapped potential for supplementation of intelligence/ suppression/ interdiction programs because, as a rule, they enjoy popular mandates in areas of their administration, having earned these mandates through the excersise of policies in consonance with the lay of the land and the will of the people; conversely;

7) The DAB knows that the projection of intelligence/ suppression/ interdiction programs from a Burmo-centric power base has not been effective in the past, is not effective now, nor is it likely to be effective in the future, regardless of the political climate.

Additionally, th DAB took note of the testimony of Sherman Funk, Inspector general at the State Department before the Senate Select Committee on Narcotics, during which he appeared to advocate immediate development of blueprints for US narcotics policy to be implemented in the event of a change of government in Burma. In light of Mr. Funk's testimony, the DED document might be interpreted as unilateral compliance in good faith by the DAB.

I fully expect the DED document to be greeted with hoots of derision from certain quarters. Risking bluntness for the sake of clarity, I would only respond to naysayers that what they see is what they may very likely get, sooner rather than later, like it or not. The alarms are ringing from the jungle highlands to the inner cities of the west, and it is time to respond, creatively.

Submission of this document should not be construed as abandonment of DAB member programs along "developmental" lines and strategies. These programs muddle along, despite horrendous odds, ennui, etc.- but occasionally score some surprising successes. One example: The KIO under Chairman Brang Seng induces villiagers away from opium cultivation and into jade, gem and gold mining. It works because each villiager who agrees to stop cultivating and begin mining is automatically exempted by the KIO from taxes on any jade, gems or gold they find. This policy has resulted in a marked decrease in cultivated acreage in KIO administered areas. I believe Josef Silverstien at Rutgers can provide details on this program.

I am wary of the motives behind, the accuracy of, and the sources from which allegations against Brang Seng arise. As always, the offer stands: American born agents of the DEA are welcome to visit Kachin areas. This will be no potempkin tour; they will be given freedom of movement and inquiry.

The DED concept is by and large, the brainchild of Ye Kyaw Thu, a naturalized Burmese- American who has been active in the Burmese pro-democracy movement for twenty years. Mr. Thu holds the title of Advisor to the Presidium of the DAB, will serve as co-ordinator for the implementation of programs to be carried out by the DED, and carries the full mandate of the DED for liason purposes.

Together with Tin Maung Win, (now General Secretary of the DAB) Ye Kyaw Thu founded the Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma, a worldwide organization linking Burmese expatriates who share the common goal of democracy in Burma. Mssrs. Thu and Win were possibly the first persons of note in the Burmese exile community to recognize the plight of the ethnic minorities and consequently, over the years, have sought and been sought out by the ethnics to establish mutually advantageous strategies facilitating the emergence of national reconciliation and federal pluralism. There is reason to believe that Mssrs. Thu and Win will play an important role engineering the emergence of democratic federalism in the months and years ahead.

In 1987-'88 Ye Kyaw Thu and Tin Maung Win met on several occasions with officials of the DEA for the purpose of brokering a meeting between the DEA and Brang Seng (now also first Vice-Chairman of the DAB). These meetings were arranged by Colonel Robert Helvey (DIA), former military attache to Rangoon and now Dean of Attache Training at Bolling. Colonel Helvey, an acknowledged expert on Burmese affairs, maintains a close personal friendship wth Mssrs. Win and Thu. It is worth noting that at this time, the DEA is discreetly assisting Tin Maung Win and Ye Kyaw Thu as a conduit for information to persons of note in the opposition in Rangoon. This is very much appreciated, a very good sign, and clearly should be kept confidential.

Bo Mya, President of the Karen National Union (KNU), as well as President of the DAB is a staunch patron of the DED. Those who know Bo Mya perceive a man whose hatred of drugs is palpable, visceral, almost unsettling. This aversion is probably forged in his religious orientation, he being a devout Seventh - Day Adventist. I sometimes suspect that his current beleagerment is partly attributable to his flat refusal to play shell games with drugs. That, of course, is mere suspicion. But here is a fact: The negotiations for logging concessions between Royal Thai Army (RTA) front companies and the Rangoon regime were predicated on a sellout of Bo Mya, while enriching upper - echelon RTA and Rangoon military personell. That the sellout might neutralize the most virulently anti- drug persona in the border region was clearly not a prohibiting factor in the deal. We are somewhat smug and mollified in the knowledge that a total elimination of Karen participation in logging is not tactically feasible, despite the worst of intentions.

Bo Mya, Brang Seng, and the rest of the DAB are familiar with the geostrategic dynamic in the drug trade which results in Thailand's laissez - faire handling of the trafficking issue at

ertain levels. The DAB subscribes to the theory that the poppy is a proxy paymaster for anti- communist bulwharks and buffer troops. Their question now is, given the collapse of the Berlin wall, is even Bo Mya still persona- non- grata at INCOS? One might assume that the question itself is implied in the form of the confidential document.

I think the US can count on Bo Mya to sustain his resolve against drugs. But I would be remiss if I failed to table this caveat: Bo Mya is an overworked, harried leader whose lieutenents regard the DEA as a praetorian guard for select traffickers, an ominous sentiment which must be rebutted, as I have tried.

There is a paradox implicit in KNU/DAB views - that while they revere the US and are positively maudlin with gratitude for US policy as a whole, they view the DEA as rogue, a disembodied institution unrepresentative of the United States of America. The paradox is underscored upon discovery that they like and want to work with the american DEA agents as individuals. This is because the agents themselves are a brave and savvy lot of great guys to be around. That they are willing and able to grapple with this problem creatively is not in dbout. The problem is that they are currently subordinate to difficult and possibly anachronistic marching orders, or possibly no orders at all. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the DAB looks forward to working with the DEA.

We often point out that the DEA is as overworked as Bo Mya, and are constrained from dialogue with the DAB by overarching diplomatic imperatives, not the least of which is Rangoon's threat to close the US embassy if they find out the US talks to insurgents. In essence, the DAB rejoinder to this is: "In forty years we have never told Rangoon who we are talking to or why, and we're not about to start now. And even if they do find out, given the current state of affairs, who cares."

I won't allow this letter to degenerate into a polemic tirade asessing the guilt or innocence of any party. Because exclusive focus on guilt or innocence isn't productive, and is usually manipulated into a red herring to obfuscate reality. If honestly certifiable non-involvement were the sole criteria for cooperation, the US would have no heroin program at all. So it should do no great damage to let me concede for the sake of argument that persons subordinate to some constituent members of the DAB are involved in trafficking.

If rank seniority within a given institutional hierarchy and /or extent of involvement is any barometer of the degree of cooperation a given group might deserve from the DEA, then cooperation and kudos are often bestowed on the wrong characters.

There is clearly a difference between an itinerant DAB patrol trafficking for a few AK-47's and archfiend Khin Nyunt, ritual drug burner and heir apparent to the national sceptre, duffing down the fairways of Rangoon Country Club with Lo Sing Han.

the end, a ticket on the fast track to success in the drug trade is punched via alliance with Rangoon, and by default or explicit intent, by being opposed to the DAB. (Significantly, whether the party is a DAB member or not.)

So we all reach the essence of the impasse: The DAB wants dialogue now, whereas the US does not want dialogue now. It would be a good idea for the US to forstall any degeneration of DAB goodwill in narcotics matters, and avoidance of rapproachment with Rangoon is only step one.

UNFDAC - Thailand - Rangoon crop substitution plans are laudable on paper, but with SLORC in the mix, have the potential to create a situation where food is used as weapon a la Mengistu. Additionally, Thai buffer or no, they are potentially illegal under the UN charter. Security under the plan is to be provided by the Rangoon military, who will shanghai porters for the five year operation and subject them to conditions without pay under which some will die (depositions available). The porter phenomenon fits every criteria defining slave labor of which I am aware, including that of the UN. UNFDAC should reconsider before somebody else figures this out.

I will hijack some audacious high ground and suggest that it might be auspicious if UNFDAC could try to convince SLORC to stop looting and burning legitimate produce during their orgiastic extermination sprees in the first place, a more sensible first step, I'm sure you will agree. As it is, it appears UNFDAC is bent on making it a threesome at Rangoon G.& C.C.

If US step one is avoidance of SLORC and their modus operendi, then step two would consist of a meeting between Ye Kyaw Thu and US narcotic officials of a GS status equal to the gravity of the issue. Mac Mackenzie and/or Tom Becker are welcome at this meeting. Step two can be taken whether step one is taken or not. The venue for this meeting can be anywhere except Thailand or Burma (Washington being the first choice) and should be conducted with absolutely no publicity. There are simply too many security factors and interdependent forces at work for the DAB to consider any other avenue. If the above stated conditions were deemed appropriate, Ye Kyaw Thu could easily meet officials in his capacity as CRDB General Secretary and American citizen, rather than as Advisor to the Presidium of the DAB. This of course is in case there is any overriding reluctance on the part of US officials to meet anyone under the direct aegis of the DAB. As per instructions, I would accompany Ye Kyaw Thu as an advisor. We feel that this arrangement is operable in that it will allow Washington to begin substantive dialogue with mandated persons, while providing an adequate prophylactic to thwart charges of opposition collusion, should such charges materialise from Rangoon, as they always do anyway, whether meetings like this take place or not.

If the DED document and/or the proposed meeting are rebuffed, I urge utmost delicacy in so doing. At a minimum, we must be given

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the tools to couch responses in legitimate and encouraging terms. Although the ethnics are hardly strangers to rejection, one can sense that in light of recent events, it is different this time around - flat dismissal of DAB initiatives solely on the grounds that a response is tantamount to a breech of diplomatic protocol is unwise, illogical, and hopefully unnecessary.

I also urge US officals not to reject these initiatives on the grounds that they must by definition be insincere. I can only say that certain operations contemplated by the DED are sensitive in the extreme. Some of the motives which culminated in the development of the DED are veiled due to security constraints, and the veil can only be lifted orally, in executive session.

I am not at liberty to elaborate much further in this communication, but I can stress this: To the best of my knowledge and belief, the US has nothing to fear from DED initiatives - it is we who are afraid.

The DAB specifically approved my forwarding of the confidential version of the DED document to you. I feel confident that should any direct dialogue evolve between your good offices and those of the DED, you would find the results most illuminating.

Very Truly Yours,

George Pittaway
Chiangmai 50000
Thailand

29 July 1990
Thai-Burma border

Joan Vail
Office of The President
Office of National Drug Control Policy
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Joan;

I hope all is well with you and yours. In reference to our meeting concerning Burma this March past, please find enclosed the recent policy statement of the Drug Enforcement Directorate (DED), a bureau of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). As you may recall, I promised to forward you any narcotics policy statements issued by pro-democracy groups in Burma.

I'd like to take this opportunity, if I may, to provide a bit of background on the rationale which precipitated the formation of the DED, and also to impart a biographical feel for a few of the players, who by circumstances of citizenship, credebility within the DAB, and contribution to the organizational structure of the DED would best be suited for liason purposes.

Notwithstanding the contention (a correct one, and another subject entirely), that lasting and truly fruitful solutions to the narcotic situation in Burma is contingent upon cessation of the civl war, national reconciliation, and the infrastructural development peace would engender, the DAB has identified a need to organize anti-narcotic policies along intelligence/ suppression/ interdiction models in the near term.

This is by and large because:

1) The DAB realizes that international narcotic control organizations (hereafter INCOS) such as the DEA will continue to operate intelligence/ suppression/ interdiction programs regardless of the state of internal affairs in Burma, and that these operations will likely intensify. Since the pursuit of policies conducive to a lessening of civil strife fall outside the perview of INCOS, the DAB felt the need for an apparatus whose organizational structure accomodates the methadologies employed by the INCOS.

2) The DAB realizes that even given internal peace, INCOS will play a significant role into the forseeable future.

3) The DAB believes that INCOS must sense that the mid-to-long (probably near) term power equation in Burma is unpredictable, and that it is concievable that persons with whom they establish rapport today could be gone tommorrow.

4) The DAB knows that should a true shakeout occur, a

The Simplification of Laos

(Narrative Portion)

Draft No. 2

Spring '85

James Pittaway

Murazzano, Italy

Back in '63 my dad was transferred to Bangkok. After 16 years of drab and identical Air Force bases located in some of the most boring, desolate places in the US, Thailand was exciting and mysterious.

We lived in a compound which was a walled garden really, with a pond and bright beautifully manicured tropical plants and flowers. There were four houses in the compound and on the grounds of each house was a small colorful miniature pagoda, the size of - say - a microwave oven, set on a pedestal about 4 feet off the ground. Close inspection revealed a masterpiece of miniature design. There were walls and columns supporting a sculpted roof and forming an intricate labyrinth.

Within this labyrinth spirit beings which the Thais called phee would become disoriented and entrapped and were thus not free to go about infesting and afflicting humans as is their wont and function. The servants devoted a great deal of attention to these spirit houses. In fact a close look at their quarters and even their persons revealed a panoply of shrines, figurines, amulets and even extensive supernaturally prophylactic tattoos. The little altars in each of the servants' rooms were Buddhist, and the focus of an intricate daily devotional life. But there was also an elaborate ritual life built aroung the spirit houses. For along with their Buddhist theology and ethic, the Thais apprehend a complicated supernatural order.

It's as if they perceive not just air but an ether, which is inhabited by living beings - some benign but more usually malevolent. According to Thai belief phee can by manipulated or warded off by a variety of means which along with Buddhist devotional involves substantial activity on the part of most Thai people.

Westerners almost invariably greeted superstitious nonsense about phee with ill-concealed contempt. Buddhism was more respectable but consigned to the realm of an essentially condescending appreciation for the magnificent temples and splendid art. This was not lost on the Thais, who tended to dissemble a lot when matters related to their religious behaviour came up.

But the opprobrium of the westerners did not bother them much. The Thais have a word for westerners - falang - which inadequately translates as "bird" (with emphasis on the beak). It contains none of the fear and loathing implicit in the Chinese analog - foreign devils - but rather conveys a sense of affectionate ridicule. The antics of the falangs are a constant source of amusement and delight to the Thais. It was also obvious that the falangs had successfully domesticated the phee of material prosperity which could always benefit any Thai who might happen to be around. So the falangs could be as condescending as they wanted while the Thais were entertained in a kind of spontaneous, existential theater - with - ever - possible door prize. Relations were genuinely harmonious.

Even my fathers job was not boring. He had been assigned to the Pentagon's Advanced Research Project Agency. He and his colleagues were there at the behest of Mr. McNamara and the Bundy brothers who had discovered a brand new phenomena they called "brushfire war". They were there to figure out how this new kind of war could be fought.

Not only were there officers from every branch of the services and other government agencies, but also academics, diplomats, scientists, corporate officers and foundation people worked in the ARPA brain trust. There was also a substantial international contigent - officers and officials from NATO, SEATO and ANZUS. The British, having contained an insurgency in neighboring Malaya were particularly full of wisdom and came up with important contributions like "strategic hamlets" and "search and destroy". Everyone agreed that the Chinese were a menace and that the Vietnamese Communists had to be stopped.

It never occured to anyone that they might get burned on this "brush fire war" business especially not with this mix of manpower and experience. After all in a "brushfire war", who could you be fighting except a bunch of ignorant bushmen? So all they really worried about was firepower and its judicious application.

Burdened by knowledge of the extinction of cultures to the east over the last 900 years in the wake of relentless Vietnamese advance, the Thais had a visceral anxiety about the Vietnamese. They were especially pleased to have the task of stopping them so willingly assumed by the falangs. There was also the welcome prospect that the Thais might some how benefit materially from all of this, and, after all, these were the very falangs who had whipped Hitler and even Tojo and, like them, the Thais believed they would make short work of this Ho Chi Minh character.

* * *

Ho Chi Minh was not unknown at the University of California at Berkeley where I enrolled in the fall of '65. Just about everyone there was deeply committed to putting an end to all evil and nonsense in Southeast Asia. That just about anyone was able to determine what was and wasn't evil and nonsense in a place as far away and as complicated as Southeast Asia was due to the discovery of "consciousness raising" which is evidently a modern miracle and the hope of mankind. The practices of consciousness raising bore much resemblance to a sect prevalent in classical antiquity called the Gnostics who eschewed orthodox beliefs, practices and disciplines in favor of self-willed gnosis, or union with Divine Truth.

Though it is even more advanced now, the early days of Neo-Gnosticism were a wonder to behold. A crowd would assemble. Some New Age Swami would first invoke a litany of familiar male-factors, their wicked intentions and evil deeds. Then the superior virtue and pristine intentions of all those present would be resoundingly affirmed. At this moment wisdom descended upon them or they ascended to it, or perhaps it was brought to them by the phee - it was impossible to tell. But all was transformed. The chem student, the grad in English Lit., the high school senior from Daly City, the nymphomaniac housewife from San Jose, the street dealer from Telegraph Avenue; everyone of them had transcended expertise and

each had the wisdom to discern the Simple Truth about evil and nonsense in Southeast Asia. Anthems in celebration of this were sung.

The Gnostics of the ancient world wanted to hear Truth. The great discovery of Neo-Gnosticism was the subtle but profound inversion of this principle; namely, Truth was what they wanted to hear. And they liked what they heard about Ho Chi Minh. So the Neo-Gnostics didn't agree with the Thais at all. They knew that this Ho Chi Minh guy was a progressive, that he stood for Peace and Freedom and most importantly, like themselves, (but unlike others they had heard about) he was a warm, wonderful human being.

In this environment there was little demand for virtually obsolete university courses having to do with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless the university, always at least a half step behind the students, offered a broad range of them and retained a faculty as fully qualified and respectable as those in other areas where mass transcendance of knowledge based on fact, logic and experience had not yet taken place.

Since I wanted to live in Thailand again I enrolled in these courses which was fortunate because the faculty - unlike so many of their colleagues-taught small classes and seminars, and were available on a personal basis. Subjects like Thai religion, Laotian politics, Vietnamese history and Cambodian peasant society were integrated into my program.

Social Science professors at Berkeley are a wordly group of men and women. For example they know that Asian animism has no empirical basis and that this phee business is nonsense pure and simple. In the anthropology department for example, nothing could have been more socially unacceptable than to make an ethnic joke. Yet every professor had some hysterical anecdote about animist behavior which was guaranteed to leave the class on the floor. However they all understood that such beliefs are almost universal in Asia and that social life and personal identity can be very tightly strung around such rituals and perceptions. Unlike ordinary falangs, scholars are able to retain their respect for Asian peasants in spite of the fact that they think what these people actually be-

lieve is absurd.

That they are able to do this is the gift of a genius named Jean Jacques Rousseau. According to this view, while the animist peasants may be more ignorant, he is also more noble than the rest of us. So it all evens out in a warm, fuzzy brotherhood of man wherein we admire their nobility and they follow paths to progress blazed by us. It was supposed to be how the world worked, or how it ought to work anyway. I could hardly restrain my enthusiasm to actually go and see.

* * *

Following a year of graduate work I gave in to my impulses. After a year or so travelling by bus, train and thumb around Eurasia I arrived in Vientiane, Laos in July of '71.

Laos was a complicated little country caught up in an even more complicated situation. To begin with it is geographically complex with jungle covered mountains, a maze of isolated river valleys and a densely populated strip of rice land along the Mekong. Its ethnic complexity derives from its location as a kind of historical no - mans - land between China, Vietnam and Thailand. Populated by these three groups plus a variety of quite distinct tribal people, it was a great country, but a pretty poor excuse for a nation.

Which was why the political and military situation was if possible even more complicated than geography or ethnicity. First of all there were the Lao, the dominant ethnic group; sort of poor relations to the Thais. They were split into three factions, neutralist, rightist and communist. The neutralist wing included most of the royal family and was strongly tied to the French imperialists who had place them in power before departing in 1955. They controlled what there was of the central government bureaucracy. The Pathet Lao was an orthodox sub-unit of the Indochinese communist Party which was ruled by a 100% Vietnamese politburo in Hanoi. They controlled a substantial piece of the countryside, and had a reasonably effective army in the field. The "rightists" were patronized by the Thai military and dominated, such as it was, the Royal Laotian Army and Air Force. Sort of.

The "Hmong" or hill tribes were divided into two coalitions; one was the pride and joy of the CIA, the other allied uneasily with the Pather Lao. There were independent chieftains, opium warlords, even Kuomuntang units who came into the area with Vinegar Joe Stillwel in '44 and never left.

Reality was determined by the Indochina War and the ubiquitous mutually beligerent foreigners whose presence had been mandated by a sequence of conferences in Geneva where the Americans and the far wiser European Colonial powers met with the Russians and split legalistic hairs over Laos. Laos was "neutralized" in a series of agreements where everything was prohibited so anything was possible. The agreements insured that the weakest faction would control the Laotian government and strict limits on aid and advisors saw to it that the Royal Laotian Army was always the weakest force in the field.

Having thus set the pitch the powers mounted a veritable Spook Olympiad. The prohibition on overt intervention and the unanimous intent by all parties to intervene one way or another meant that everybody had a prodigious embassy and support facilities. CIA, KGB, the French, Peking, Hanoi and the Thais fielded serious contending teams. East Germans, Czechs, North & South Koreans, Israelis, Australians, Pakistanis and a host of others were there to substitute for the big guys or for special events in which they were particularly strong. Contests involved spies, commandos, infantry, artillery and air power. There was an economy to manipulate, a government to subvert and a colorful variety of people to be destroyed or captured.

They even sent referees. Geneva mandated the International Control Commission conposed of Poles, Yugoslavs, Indians and Canadians who drove around in jeeps, wore special armbands and were instructed to keep score and call fouls. There were other, not - necessarily - benign kibbitzers, spectators and provocateurs from the UN, Red Cross et al, journalists, missionaries, speculators, drug dealers, black marketeers and mercenaries. It was apparent that Laos would be much simpler after the Games, but Vientiane was certainly not boring. I thought I'd take a job teaching English and so

rented a house.

The mile or so walk to work was initially, delightful. My lane opened up on a broad; tree lined avenue - one of the few paved roads in the city but still somehow permanently choked with inescapable red dust. The old French graveyard was about 1/3 of a mile down on the left. Coming abreast of that the vista opened to a broad quadrangle about 1/4 mile square. On the far right was probably the most ludicrous thing I saw anywhere in Asia - a scaled down version of the Arc de Triomphe astride a rutted red clay road, erected to commemorate some French victory (I believe it was for their defeat of the Empire of Japan) as bogus as the thing itself. Though much smaller than its original, this was still the preponderent architectural feature of the city.

On the right coming into the quadrangle was police headquarters, a large wood-frame building, like all other seats of the Royal Laotian Government, in perpetual disrepair. At the end of the parade ground which flanked the police station was the Vientiane central market. On the east and west sides of the quad were most of the Royal Laotian government buildings intermixed with embassies. The south end of the quad ran along the Mekong and a corner of that area was fenced. This was the compound of the Pathet Lao.

The market had to be one of the most fascinating handful of acres on the face of the earth. To begin with Laos, though landlocked, was a "duty free port". French cognac, American cigarettes, Japanese stereos, gold, guns and heroin were among the things to be had more cheaply and easily there than anywhere else in the world. With smugglers, traders and Vientianes ubiquitous international community pumping hard currency into a phony economic boom, the market place thrived. Food stalls and tea shops offered a variety of delicacies from all over Asia. And everyone in Vientiane who did not work in an air conditioned office - which meant everybody but the Americans - was forced by the heat and the ambiance to adopt somewhat languid work habits. So the market teemed at all hours of the day with a cross section of the not uninteresting citizens of Vientiane.

The school where I taught was just 1/2 block beyond the south west egress from the market so in my meanderings to and from work I spent increasing amounts of time sitting and chatting in the make-shift eateries, My Thai/Lao, while not fluent, was serviceable and relationships I established with merchants and stall keepers plugged me into the market's formidable, extensive and sensitive information grapevine and rumor mill. By fortuitous coincidence I had met a member of the neutralist wing of Lao's Royal family in Nepal the previous spring so there was access to a sector of the Laotian melange not automatically accessable to Americans. My students ranged from Chinese petty merchants to fairly senior Laotian army and police officers.

Since there was plenty of available time it seemed reasonable to apply the theory and methods of anthropoligical field work to which I had been exposed at Berkeley. The government bureaucrats, diplomats and officials of the countless agencies were surprisingly available and often loquacious informants. Amid the dissembling and evasions it was generally possible to at least get a grasp of prevailing illusions and even extrapolate hard information.

In any event it could all be cross-checked in the market. Though few falangs came, and those that did didn't sit and eat; they all sent their servants. Everyday. And the servants did tarry and talk a great deal. Everybody wanted to know about the doings and sayings of the falangs - and the servants knew just about everything. What they didn't know was known by the clerks, secretaries, drivers and errand boys who also had lunch in the market; and who were entirely at the mercy of peer pressure to reveal everything that they knew. There was a lot of nonsense, much of it salacious, some very entertaining, but present in the amorphous whole of it were the guts of every evil secret in town.

It soon became apparent that the communists had this market thing scoped and their people were all over the place. It was equally clear that an entire class of people - servants, office boys, drivers and other menials - were as unreliable from the stand point of security as they were indespensable to the falangs. When I asked a police colonel who was one of my advanced students about this he at first assured me that it was not so but when pressed admitted

falangs seemed happy to tolerate things the way they were and it was not the job of the Royal Lao Police to insist upon unpleasantries about which falangs clearly did not care to hear.

So the falangs sat there like the three monkeys on a log. I guess if they could pretend this was a neutral country where everybody had rules to live by they could certainly convince themselves that they were dealing with the Asian version of the Swiss security police. Meanwhile the communists reaped incalculable intelligence and operational dividends from this nonsense. That's when it became obvious to me that - when it came - communist victory would be total. Who could possibly negotiate except to buy time when they enjoyed advantages like that?

* * *

At the end of August came the worst Mekong flooding in decades. It was as if the weather phee were playing their overture to the carnage that was to come in the subsequent dry season when military operations reached the highpoint of the war.

The military situation was essentially this: In the spring of '71 the South Vietnamese, with US Commandos and massive air support had attempted to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in eastern Laos. They were routed in a defeat that made triumph of the North Vietnamese Communists inevitable. With the Americans clearly on the way out the door, the NVA had secured its supply lines and from then on it was wait, probe, talk, play for position, bleed the enemy, prepare for the final offensive and, meanwhile, sieze Laos.

The rout of the South Vietnamese, freed large nembers of NVA troops who had been holding the trail. In light of the sole remaining threat - bombing - Hanoi had every incentive to remove troops from the trail area. Reinforced and resupplied by the onset of the dry season, some of the toughest and best armed combat units the world had ever seen began swarming all over Laos. By early November major offensives had been mounted in several different areas, provincial capitals were attacked, all major roads were cut and by December the Royal Lao Army which until then had been toyed with was smashed.

More ominous the major base of US operations at Long Chen was besieged. This effectively broke the CIA backed "Hmong" and put Vientiane at the mercy of the North Vietnamese, who were just over thirty miles away. That whole dry season the market teemed with rumors that the NVA was moving out of the hills.

But they didn't need to. They had demonstrated the capability to take Vientiane at any time they chose, so they dug in and waited. My friend the North Vietnamese First Secretary at the Embassy, a gentle, scholarly, patient and forgiving paragon of peace-loving Leninism, explained that if they took Vientiane the US would just blow it up. The humanitarian sentiments with which he embroidered this statement apparently did not extend to the inhabitants of the provincial capitals, which were then being reduced to rubble, first by NVA artillery then by US airpower. Besides the good citizens of Vientiane had gotten the message. They knew from then on exactly who was going to win, if not precisely when. It kept them guessing - and sweating - all the time.

The US did not take all this lying down, but it was down to one card. Air power. The Air Force that General Le May had built around the doctrine of strategic bombing took off the gloves and hit Laos with the most extensive bombing campaign in history. That more bombs were dropped on Laos than were dropped by all sides in WWII is a mind numbing fact and most bombs were dropped that dry season. But far more important than gross totals are what gets dropped, where it's dropped, why it's dropped and what happens when it's dropped.

I'm not even going to attempt to catalogue the kinds of air weaponry used, the reader can find good descriptions of the terror weapons of the modern air arsenal elsewhere. As to where they were dropped, that is significant. Until this past it had been mainly confined to uninhabited regions around the trail but as the NVA moved into populated areas in the mountain plains and valleys, they brought the omnivorous maw of air war to the towns, hamlets and farms of the upland Lao.

As to why they were dropped, a USAF officer in Bangkok explained to me that besides interdicting the trail and hampering communist

operations, it was hoped that the people would "evacuate" to the narrow strip of plain along the Mekong which the Royal Laotian Government was - erroniously - thought to be able to control. I thought the colonel sincerely believed that a healthy dose of bombing would have the salubrious effect of rousing Joe Slope from his ageless torpor and make him see his own self interest, leave his land, wake up in a government camp, and be grateful that Uncle Sam was around to shape him up. And get him ready for the 20th century. A veritable Rousseau in combat boots.

The first two objectives of this grand design failed miserably. But when the bombing came to the populated areas people died horribly, dug in and endured four dimensional terror or fled. It served communists interests admirably for it, destroyed the infrastructure of traditional Lao society.

In '75 this legacy of displaced persons was brutally organized for forced labor which is such an important component of "Primitive Socialist Accumulation", the Stalinist social policy imposed on Laos by the Vietnamese Communists. The disruptions in family systems, land tenure, market networks and village homogeneity caused by the bombing campaign served traditional long range Vietnamese goals of settling surplus youth and other undesirable in Laos with the idea that in 1 or 2 generations the frontier of Vietnamese society, would be firmly established on the Mekong.

Le May's Air Force accomplished another communist objective by bombing the provincial capitals of Pakse and Savannaket, traditional centers of regional autonomy, when they were briefly seized by the NVA. These were of no use to the Vietnamese who were only interested that the central government apparatus fall to them intact. As to the infrastructure in the countryside they were more than content to have the life blood of cammerce and communications solely in the hands of NVA logistics. In a postwar environment they could do the job quite capably and see who gets what; and they do.

The military situation had a profound effect on life in Vientiane. The population began to swell week by week which further eroded morale. Most of the new arrivals were destitute and some were horribly maimed. The police at first tried to round up the maimed and put them in the makeshift camps which were sprouting up outside the

city. But the tide was unstoppable and they soon gave up.

Shantytowns began springing up on every available piece of ground and people somehow managed to eke out an existance, mainly off the gleanings of the marketplace. But by late November, many foreigners were packing and smart Lao and Chinese money was on its way out the door. So the bubble burst in the marketplace and only the strongest enterprises survived. Then the currency was devalued 50%. This all combined to generate a plague of beggars.

In January they tried a big drug crackdown, and they shut down the opium dens. It was anticipated, except by the newcomers out of the hills, who just went bananas. They literally terrorized the market place. Visually, it was as if Dachau had been transplanted into the streets but made even more horrible because of the dementia of drug denial that blazed on their eyes. This was the third plague of hysterical humans to invade the market since the floods, and it was just the first week in January. The crackdown was accurately seen as American inspired. The timing could not have been worse. It was disasterous for the credability of the Laotian Government and America's benign intent went, to say the least, unappreciated.

The friendships I had acquired began to deteriorate. I found myself constantly looking into the eyes of people facing the loss of everything, up to and including their freedom and their lives. And, oh, how they knew it! That thousands of ordinary Americans knew well how benign the Vietnamese Communists were didn't seem to comfort my friends at all. People in that state tend to become distracted, insular and depressing to be around.

So my friends in the market were stuck in various stages of shock, panic or ennui. My students, who all had some tangible investment in stopping the communists were mired in avoidance and displacement behavior. The prince was packing for France. The falangs were, if possible, even more bombastic than ever and knew absolutely that this was all going to be rolled right back. By

this time I was sick of listening to the North Vietnamese. It was impossible to recesstate my social life, so I made plans to leave for Cambodia. More for want of interim company than anything else, I began checking out the DP's coming in from the countryside.

* * *

One of the places towards which the DP's gravitated was the old French graveyard which I passed on my way to work. A shanty-town had sprung up and the population was growing daily. I suppose I had noticed it before but one day as I was walking by it occurred to me that the conditions of existance in this place contravened everything I had learned or seen regarding the nature and primacy of spiritual life in Southeast Asia. Their lives were in fact be-fret of rite, their quarters had no altars, images, incense. There were none of the ubiquitous of spirit houses. As I came to know them as individuals, unlike any other people I had known in South-east Asia, they had not the slightest outward interest in or fear of the spirit world.

To the ordinary citizens of Vientiane these people were out-casts, and because of how and where they lived, unspeakably unclean. I was at first so appalled that I was forced to come up with a eupherism and dubbed this place the "Necropolis". It was hard for anyone to assimilate. There were corpses in there! Buddhists, of course, cremate their dead, and animists believe that a corpse is infested with evil spirits. But the country people came and went seemingly oblivious.

* * *

The gulf between city and country people in Southeast Asia has always been wide. The modern era, which has utterly transformed urban life has engendered few real changes in the beliefs and prac-tices of the peasantry. As a result the gulf has become a chasim, which is little appreciated because of a patronizing tendency to see the peasantry as the quaint little caboose on the ol'Freedom Train which must be painted red or otherwise overhauled if it is to come along with the rest of us. Whether or not this is true out of some historical necessity, seeing it as an existing condition led planners to consistantly underestimate the peasantry as a re-source base (eg. the Viet Cong) or an entity capable of acting on its own (eg. Khmer Rouge).

In fact at about this time the Khmer Rouge were beginning to make themselves felt. There was no question that something quite different had started in Cambodia. But no one seemed to know very much about it. My own inquiries came up with real enigma. The known leadership of the KR was a group of Left Bank intellectuals who had been around for years confined to the lunatic fringe of Cambodian politics. In less than two years they had supposedly succeeded in organizing something which had all the earmarks of a massive peasant-based movement.

Falangs and the Asian elites were certain that this was just another communist insurgency manipulated - in this case - by the Chinese. Even the North Vietnamese had confidently assured me that the Khmer Rouge represented a "pluralistic movement for national liberation". But the stories filtering into the market depicted aims and methods which had more to do with extermination than liberation or even conquest. It seemed the KR were sealing off areas they controlled and, if the stories were true, the peasants (old people) were destroying everything, including the temples, and systematically killing everybody on the other side of the chasim (new people).

The only reliable information I had on the KR I picked up from some Khmers who came up regularly from Battambang to buy the usual list of contraband and luxury goods to smuggle back into Cambodia. They told me to believe all rumors; it was so bad it could not be put into words - "noone comes out of there alive". The KR were beasts and infested with the most evil variety of phee.

I was sceptical at that point of what seemed to be outrageous claims and discounted the information because they could not quote directly someone who had actually dealt with the Khmer Rouge. They just kept claiming "no one gets out but people somehow know"! I figured they were the source of the gruesome rumors, but something in their voices and eyes squelched any notions I had of going and trying to find out for myself.

It was peasants such as these who were now pouring into the Necropolis. Of course they were Lao and not Khmer, but in the parlance of the Khmer Rouge - which was just then beginning to be heard in the market - they were authentic "old people". They shared other important features. The KR were reputed to be apostate these people evidently practiced apostacy;and they were both the flotsam of air war.

In light of these similarities I focused my inquiries of the "old people" of the Nectopolis and began to spend increasing amounts of time there. I was befriended by a gregarious, intelligent and very well informed woman named Phet. She was half Chinese and half Hmong, a combination which would make her an outcast in normal times but in the inverted world of the Necropolis she was queen. She was connected with the Chinese underworld and was a part time police informer. She was a fixer and a procurer; the interface between the Necropolis and the world outside. She also ran the opium den. Though her prestige was low, because she was indespensible and so inclined, her power was absolute. She was a stunning female analog to Clavell's King Rat.

She told me her own story, the story of her family and all about everyone else in the Necropolis. These stories were initially sanitized - of politics, existing links with the hinterland and, most especially, the war. When I querried her about the spirit world she clung doggedly to the assertion that this phee business was all just superstitious nonsense.

The other women worked constantly, weaving baskets making artifacts, doing manual labor in the market place, stealing, selling dope, anything; anything that is, but beg. The range of survival skills was astonishing and their pursuit of elementary survival was fierce and relentless. The apparent physical health of the children in the accompanying photos is - in view of their objective circumstances and prospects - astonishing. Yet it was built on pathology, an achievement crafted from the depths of individual and collective hysteria.

Typhus. Phet knew what that was. Yet her children were permitted to dig - along with the dogs and pigs - anywhere. Coffins were inadvertainly disenterred and sometimes came apart only to have one of the women throw a shovelful of dirt to cover the offending stench. There were no admonitions, no cautions, no alternatives. Their admitted awareness of incredible health hazards did not translate into any attempt to remidy the situation. Beyond the filling of the bellies of their children and the maintenance of compulsively swept, immaculately ordered quarters there was simply no reality, with which it was worth trying to cope.

Food and shelter were available in the camps outside the city but to go would be to relinquish control of economy and food supply, something the women held on to with the vice grip of obsession. To let go of that was, to them, to surrender to oblivion and these women still had their function.

Not so the men, who, could usually be found at Phet's. They were at first enigmatic, shadowy figures at the periphery of the arc cast by the opium lamp. Only after Phet explained to me politely as she could - that this was no Chinese whorehouse and that I would have to prepare my own pipes - by then I though I might as well - did one of the men even pay me the slightest attention.

He was an old Hmong and could barely speak Lao but with deft and patient bemusement he showed me the complex rite of the pipe; how to heat the opium, knead it to its proper consistently and insert it into the pipe so that it can be cleanly vaporized when held over the oil lamp. In fact he was one of the only men there who smoked a pipe, the old wpmen dissolved the opium in their coffee, but most of the men injected themselves with powder, dissolved in water heated in a spoon. These men in fact had developed imaginative and innovative places and means to inject themselves and enhance the sensuality of the orgasmic rush. Other than that, and their apostacy, to which this behavior was perhaps related, the men of Phet's were representative of a cross section of tribal types and ordinary Lao peasants.

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It took awhile, but once they began to deign to deal with me they were more than willing to tell all about what had happened to them. I spent far to many hours in that shadowy, sticky-sweet acrid room listening to their flat, reedy voices which seemed devoid of emotion as they murmured of unspeakable horrors and crimes as if they were talking about feeding the chickens. In too many hours and far too many days, I heard far too many stories. So I will restrain myself and try to stick with an image of one man I knew - just a fragment from my journal - a fragment from an innocent world blown apart. A fragment from the endless, bottomless, hypnotic horror stories told to me by the men of the Necropolis.

He was a 40 year old rice farmer who had lost three sons and a daughter. When the NVA moved in to the valley, the men with the guns took his two oldest sons gave them shovels and said "dig". One son died when a communications tunnel he had been digging collapsed. The other son and his 19 year old daughter were taken away when the main Viet units moved south toward the provincial capital of Savannaket. No one knew what happened to them. But in the market we heard enough accounts of Savannaket to make some reasonable assumptions.

They left him his 15 year old son and his wife and the Viet's with the guns who garrisoned the hamlet said "farm".

Not long after the Viets came the earth itself erupted and the air was filled with white-hot pieces of steel. The sky would explode and burn. The Viets said the Americans did it but they lied about everything and it was impossible to tell where it was all coming from or even what it was. The idea that it had something to do with people was simply incomprehensible to this man. What people could do this? Why? How? Technology to him was an iron blade for his plow, a kerosene lamp. This could not be connected up with either people or things he could comprehend. It could only be the Diety, outraged and insatably aroused, furious at some dreadful failing of the Lao. Something for which there was no atonement, vengeance from which there was no protection, only endurance and submission to demonic rule in an age of terror.

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He lost his 15 year old boy and his water buffalo in one of the air strikes. It was clear he would be unable to meet the production quota imposed by the NVA garrison which would have made him automatically a "recalcitrant element" and the consequences of that were at best uncertain.

These people had known regimes that were autocratic, but even the most ruthless warlord's exercise of power was circumscribed by what could be done with swords, staves, bows and arrows. The French were too busy building monuments to themselves to bother these people much and the Japanese never really went in there either. The average upland Lao peasant say, from the Plain of Jars, was dimly aware that there was a split in the Lao Royal family and a low-grade civil war sporadicly erupted but it didn't really amount to much and it meant even less to him.

But in '71 and '72, oppression spread across the land and mayhem rained down from the sky. The Lao peasant got blindsided by the 20th century at its most viscious. The NVA infantry was - needless to say - very well and appropriately armed: For the conduct of offensive operations and for coertion of civilians.

The tactical defensive maneuver of the NVA "digging in" is one of the epics in the history of warfare. It was awesome in scope and effectiveness. In Vietnam itself, perhaps, as the propoganda films show, this feat was accomplished by heroic masses of volunteers enthusiastically chanting patriotic and revolutionary slogans as they carried their baskets of mud and dragged heavy artillery over mountains and through the steaming jungle. But the upland Lao weren't really plugged into this wonderous vision so in Laos at least, the soldiers with the guns held those guns at the heads of the Lao and Hmong men, women and children dragooned into the labor battalions which accompanied NVA forces everywhere in the field. And they were no more real or significant to the Viets than the Slavs were to the Nazis - and just as expendable. They could always serve socialism as fertilizer, and when in doubt that's exactly what they became.

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The oppression that drove him from his land may or may not have been enough to break him, but the air war saw to it that he was both broken and deranged. Though he knew nothing of technology, he thought he knew exactly what an air war was. Since childhood he had watched creatures fly and spit fire in the battles of the Hindu-Buddhist epics performed as shadow puppet plays put on at the temple as part of every festival. This staple of village life in Laos (and Cambodia) provided an eschatological point of reference for interpreting the air war. The less sophisticated the peasant, the stronger the tendency to see the air war as a kind of religious end-game. What I had initially viewed as apostacy was not so much that as the end of the utility of all prior beliefs and practices; a fulfillment of eschatological expectations grounded in his myth and folklore. For him to old age had ended and the new age had not begun. He was suspended in nothingness between the two conditions. It was a hell of an idea.

So ground between oppression and the air raids the Lao farmer, his wife and two surviving pre-pubescent children left the land and the life his ancestors had known and found sanctuary in the Necropolis. And the wife and daughters made baskets and the man shot heroin and his son played stickball with whatever he could dig up in a filthy graveyard. He had no idea who he was. He had ceased entirely to be what he had been and he knew nothing else so he didn't really know whether he was or was not. He was just a horror story walking around and so was everybody else, plunged into a nightmare - made even more twisted by the perception that there was no need or desire to escape.

By late January of '72 the marketplace was a purgatory of economic and emotional depression, rumor-borne hysteria and outright starvation. But this was somehow comprehensible, and even acceptable - after all this was a country in the throes of a catyclismic war. That kind of horror was expected - even pedestrian. People who were scared acted scared, the angry raged, the starving begged or stole, the bereaved wept.

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The Necropolis was not like that at all. The Necropolis was hell. And not just metaphorical hell either; it was - by objective interpretation of the accepted criteria of Hindu-Buddhist cosmology - Hell.

It existed in the Hindu-Buddhist Kali Yuga; the 4th and final age in the cosmological cycle, the age of eschatological destruction. Buddhist social structure, behavior and rite - even architecture - are designed to replicate, on human scale, the cosmological order of the universe. This design gives meaning and order to the life of the Buddhist peasant. The Kali Yuga comes when all of these have broken down and brings with it physical destruction, collective and individual insanity and apostacy. It is a time when evil supernatural powers ran rampant. And mankind is threshed, winnowed and husked. That was the Necropolis.

For the western mind, which sees time as a linear progression broken up into equivalent and quantifiable increments, it is difficult to apprehend a concept of time that is cyclical and qualitative. But for these peasants the body clock, the seasonal clock and the nature of the age lent time a quality that was tangible and accessable to their conscious minds and, exactly in the sense in which CG Jung meant it, "their collective unconscious" as well. The notion of the Kali Yuga thus operated on one level as a conscious awareness that the "times" themselves were evil. This sufficed, on a rational level, to explain what was happenning and determined their intentional response. On another, and perhaps far more important level their experience had touched upon some deep and unfathomable folk memory, a collective expectation fulfilled, a preexistant understanding which shared and transmitted itself. This understanding had absorbed them, subsumed their identities, and activated some ancient code that programmed them to live in hell.

And they had become inseparable from the hell in which they were a part. Loveless, mirthless, faithless, twisted and depraved men and women, could not weep, could not sleep. Rousseau would not have been comfortable in the Necropolis. The rusty coffee can where the syringes were rinsed in a putrid blood brotherhood was changed only when it started to stink so much you could smell it over the

If there was a word for that it was surely ignoble.

At first they seemed to have no emotional range and to the casual observer they would indeed appear noble, stoic, long suffering even other-worldly. But every once in a while one of them would snap and run howling, shrieking bent on mayhem and self destruction. I witnessed this infrequently, but it was so shocking in its suddeness and so total and consuming in its violence that I was convinced that no human mind, however fractured, could produce something like this. Even if the processes were rationally explicable; its energy had to be demonic.

It was as if they were broken vessels and something essential to their humanity had spilled out and left them creatures. Or else something came in an devoured their humanity. And inhabited them in its stead. What was left was only rage. A rage as cold and pure and heartless as the forces which had brought them to this pass.

There was no conceivable standard by which these people had any degree of complicity in their fate. Their innoncence was a human absolute. Violently dispossed of their loved ones, property, minds and souls their oppression was as near to a human absolute as I think you can get. Was not, then, the justice of their cause equally absolute? By any accepted standards of human rights and social justice did they not absolutely deserve justice, restitution and, logically, finally, power? But what then of their heartless rage? Justice presupposes proportionality and if these people ever passed from a passive to an assertive state one thing there would not be was proportionality. No, none at all.

There were just too many paradoxes. Mind numbing, spirit warping, psyche shattering, unavoidable, unanswerable, unendurable paradoxes. Absolute purity. Absolute pollution. Only extremes existed. Was this the outer limit of human experience? Did this mean that they were right? Was it the beginning of the end of the world? Was this all so real that all else was reduced to a trivial illusion? How could I possibly tell them that they were misinterpreting what was happening to them when their experience was perfectly symmetrical to their eschatological expectations as derived from a great world religion. In fact it was the most seductive idea I had ever encountered

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imagined.

Toward the end of February, one of Phet's sons died suddenly, inexplicable in the night. When I came around in the morning, she was still hysterical, ranting, throwing things, consumed with rage. She was screaming that the phee had done it. That the filthy Lao were infested with them and so was this filthy graveyard and their filthy country too. I could not have agreed with her more. Look at us, we were all just standing there vacant, staring, waiting for this scene to play itself out. Feeling nothing except wouldn't it be nice just to cut her throat and shut her up? I had a warm, fuzzy kind of feeling that if just one of us had made a move then, there wouldn't be many people left alive in Vientiane by nightfall. It seemed entirely reasonable that, if the world was really this shitty, just about everyone deserved to die over it and the few who didn't would probably be better off dead anyway. Or so it seemed in the Necropolis - and not one of us had ever heard of, let alone been manipulated by Pol Pot.

Of course nothing of the sort happened. Poor, fragmented, impotent little Laos bastard child of Siam would never master its own fate. Unlike Cambodia where the same sort of impulses were able to cohere and gather and rage and roar and ultimately overwhelm everything, Laos was fated to atrophy into misery and sorrow perhaps, in its own way as devestating as what happened elsewhere where these forces were unleashed. In any event I was beginning to figure out that Laos, with its stinking Necropolis, and dreadful future was no place for a nice boy like me. And beside, who would ever want to know about something like this. So I left.

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LIBERATION

MOVEMENT

OF

NEW MON STATE PARTY

Female Freedom Fighters
From: Smucker
To: Dixit

Three Pagodas Pass, Burma -- Appearances of "freedom fighters" in Southeast Asian jungles can be deceptive.

As they brush back long, black hair and assist each other with applications of lipstick and yellow cooling powder, these armed rebels of "Monland" might easily be mistaken for young ladies primping for male suitors.

The youngest is 13, and though she doesn't yet wield an AK-47 of her own, she knows the feel of one and could use it if she had to.

"I want a country of my own," said one young lady, 15, who slipped hastily out of a dress and into her fighting fatiques before an interview.

Hidden in a jungle encampment only a few kilometers inside the Burmese Thai border, these female rebels, 100 strong, comprise nearly one-third of the camp's fighting force.

They live in bamboo barracks and balance their interests between grooving to a music box, cooking, washing and manuevering on jungle ambushes of Burmese outposts.

On "National Revolution Day" this year, they marched for all of "Monland." The evening before, during a full-moon festival, a number of them dressed in pink and yellow gowns to sing anthems of revolution for patrolling male soldiers who danced and engaged in revelry.

In most respects their lives are the same as other female soldiers that fight for the over fifteen revolutionary movements and wariord strongholds lining the eastern Burmese border from Mergui in the south to the Salween river and China in the North.

And there are no superfluous women warriors among the Mon, an ancient Southeast Asian ethnic minority that once controlled a vast Kingdom in what is present-day Burma and Thailand.

in her five year career as an armed rebel. Kuchai, 17, has engaged the enemy four times. Manning the main gate of the Mon National Liberation Army (M.N.L.A.) encampment, she recently boasted about her military prowess.

"Earlier this year we attacked the Burmese at night," she said. "We killed five and wounded three."

All thirty Mon females escaped on foot into the night following this encounter, said Kuichai. "I'm confident about my fighting skills now and I think I'm as good at what I do as the male soldiers."

Like other female warriors, Kuchai described her work as "interesting."

Their aging mentor and the President of "Monland," Mr. Nai Non Lar, commends them as ranking in ability with many of the male soldiers in his army. "Five years ago you would have never seen these girls with guns," said Non Lar, director of the Mon armed insurgency.

The days when women were used only as porters are over in Burma. Women fighters have proved to be both accurate and mobile in the game of jungle warfare played between elderly male commanders and the Burmese troops of the Ne Win Regime.

The jungles of Burma seem to produce an endless supply of fanatical young nationalists, both male and female, who are prepared to die for the cause of "nations" the size of provinces and districts in neighboring Thailand.

Most of the rebel movements are members of loosely-knit fighting coalitions that are largely without ideological consistency and function mainly on an emergency basis.

Training of soldiers often begins at the age of 12 and 13, after children finish a primary education.

Nai Non Lar said he has no trouble getting recruits interested in combat.

Today, many of the female soldiers in the M.N.L.A. embody both the skills and ideals taught to them by their male commanders.

Siriporn, 15, who has been training for three years and has engaged the enemy one time, said her fighting motto is "courage for death, courage for risk and courage for victory."

The females live apart from the male soldiers in seperate barracks. Most of them blush when asked about their interest in men. Kiyichai, 19, a "career soldier," avoided completely all questions about men.

"I like fighting," said Kiyichai. "I want a bigger gun."

Kiyichai insisted that she was fighting for the "self-rule of a sovereign people -- the right to live in their own nation, unharassed by the Burmese."

Most "freedom fighters" are well-versed in the history of the Mon people, who had a written language of their own before the birth of Christ. The last Mon kingdom, known as the Hon Sa Wa Di, fell in 1757.

The language, which survives and prospers even today, is rich in Sanskrit and Buddhist legend.

Four million Mons live in Burma, while an estimated three million live in neighboring Thailand.

The modern Mon insurgency has its roots in the British colonial era before World War II. Mon leaders put up demands with the British for cultural autonomy. Today they contend that the dominant ethnic Burmese show disrespect for their culture by insisting on Burmese as the only national language of Burma.

Mon rebels are only a fraction of the entire Mon population, much of it dispersed in major cities like Bangkok and Rangoon. Still, the M.N.L.A. claims to control five districts at the top of Burma's long southern leg. Customs officials take duty at three ports on the Andaman Sea, accordin to leaders.

The stronghold of the rebel movement is here at Three Pagodas Pass, the ancient fighting turf of Thai and Burmese royal "elephant" armies.

Taxes on gems bound for Thailand and consummer products headed into Burma, comprise a large percentage of the M.N.L.A.'s monetary support.

Three Pagodas has survived a number of government offenses in recent years to become a jungle "boomtown." Despite being officially off-limits, an illicit tourist trade has gained a foothold on the rocky thoroughfares.

On a clear day brightly clad women saunter through the market, porting parasols as vendors squat near charcoal stoves roasting yellow corn.

But shop owners are aware that their prosperity relies on the strength of the "Revolution." Most residents drew deep breaths as the M.N.L.A. pushed back invading Burmese troops at the height of last year's dry season offensive. Nearly 50 Mon rebels were killed over the past full year of fighting.

Ethnic Karen rebels to the north of Three Pagodas, also fighting Rangoon troops, suffered a major setback during the government's dry season offensive. Burmese troops overran the Karen National Union military base and burnt homes and businesses along the border.

A number of rebel groups, including the Mon, encourage their civilians to take refuge in Thailand during government offenses.

Mon military leaders have joined forces with nearly 16,000 other armed Burmese rebels in the loosely knit, National Democratic Front (NDF.) Bickering is common in the ranks of the front, though military alliances usually hold true during Burmese offensives.

Many of the differences between various ethnic factions arise due to ideology and the use of opium sales to support some insurgencies. A number of rebel groups support their entire army on receipts from opium.

This summer, however, leaders gathered in July during the "Waxing Moon of Wazo" to iron out their problems and look for new friends.

"We are seeking more alliances," said a rebel leader. This may mean a future strategic arrangement with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), according to sources.

Though some leaders oppose any dealings with the communists, others welcome an agreement, especially in light of the Burmese army's increased pressure on the insurgents.

"The CPB has not influenced us at all since the beginning of our revolution and I don't expect they will since we are only growing stronger," said an NDF leader, who welcomed the new arrangement. Troop strength of the CPB is estimated at 10,000 men.

NDF members insist that they can base their future agreements on their struggle to topple the same enemy. "We are friends with all the enemies of our common enemies," said a source.

But to complicate matters further, the NDF made an agreement "in principle" with the United Lao National Liberation Front (ULNLF) at this summer's congress.

The staunchly anti-communist ULNLF largely consists of Hmong rebels fighting the Pathet Lao forces in Laos. It is the remnant rebel faction, once sponsored and trained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The ULNLF claims that the CPB is cooperating with the Vietnamese in Lao to influence Burmese villagers and transport opium products out of the region.

The CPB turned wholeheartedly to the opium trade eight years ago when China began cutting off military aid due to a dislike of the Vietnamese influences in the region.

Rangoon, which still gets substantive military support from the United States, struck at communist strongholds earlier this year.

According to rebels, over 1,000 Burmese troops were killed, though the Burmese claim they lost only 175 troops, insisting the rebels took 591 losses.

Maybe the key to unity among the assorted rebel factions is their reliance on an agrarian economy to support their revolution. Apart from trade in jade and gems, most rebel groups grow rice in addition to cash crops like opium.

NDF policy, outlined this summer, specifies the "practice of an agrarian system conducive to the benefit of the peasants and farmers as a motive force for the revolution."

Burmese authorities, of course, claim to have similar intentions. Many in the socialist regime of Ne Win are well-trained in the logic of agrarian revolution, having received their education in Moscow.

This weekend there was a meeting of the leadership of the Democratic Alliance of Burma. It was a very important meeting because the DAB is on the theshold of taking power here in Burma. There were many things to be sorted out including strategies for dealing with the outgoing socialist military tyrrany, constitutional models appropriate to a highly complex and ethnically diverse nation, and policies for dealing with the innundation of commercial oppurtinities once the wealthiest nation in this rich part of the world completes the transition to a stable government and a free market economy. In short, an assortment of issues happily becoming familiar to similar groups around the globe as the world moves through the astonishing process of the wholesale collapse of tyrrany.

But the DAB had another item on its agenda this weekend, one that is equally timely and imminent. Because, once the transition is completed, the largest opium producing region on the planet will fall under the control of the political and military forces of the alliance. The notorious "Golden Triangle" and the infamous heroin warlord Khun Sa will finally be brought to bay by forces unified in their committment to stamp out - once and for all - the plague that has bathed the world in sorrow and brought opprobrium and notoriety to a region and a people of inestimable beauty fundamental virtue and incalculable promise.

Those of us attending the meeting were at great pain to supress our euphoria and restrain the element of celebration and mutual congratulation so that we could attend to the practical details of the agenda at hand. Some of our collegues had been engaged in the most brutal kind of no-quarter jungle warfare for more than forty years, others had endured long periods of imprisonment with the attendant torture and maiming that an unspeakably brutal regime so routinely inflicted on any opponents who fell into its hands. All but the somewhat motley handful of foreign advisors had suffered the travail of families destroyed, property confiscated, friends and loved ones slaughtered followed by harrowing escapes and impecunious, humiliating exile.

But there was much to do and many very important things to be decided. There is also very little time and fewer resources available to accomplish all the things that need to be done. So reccomendations were made, resolutions adopted and assignments were handed out. Since there were only people and a clear unity of purpose, we actually did manage to take concrete steps in most areas, including ratification of the basic outline for our post-settlement narcotics policy and its attendant programs, to be fleshed out and presented to various governments and international organizations, including the government of the United States of America.

The basic thrust of the narcotics eradication policy of the incoming government of Burma will be a carefully crafted mixture of economic incentives, crop substitution, education and treatment programs augmented by the judicious application of police and even military force where absolutely necessary. We can reasonably expect to cut production of opium and its derivitives by 80% within 18-24 months of a ceasefire between our forces and those of the army of the current regime. Within 5

years, Burma will cease to produce opium beyond licensed and carefully surpervised programs in line with quotas agreed upon by UN and other appropriate agencies. Though demand in the west and the anticipated failure of the major consuming nations to effectively stem it will inevitably result in the introduction of opiate production and trafficking into other areas of the world plagued by instability, war and corruption, the "Golden Triangle" will cease to exist.

These optomistic projections can be made with confidence - even certainty - because the root cause of the problem and the greatest obstacle to its resolution, the civil war in Burma, will have been eliminated. Furthermore, the opium growing regions of Burma lie immediately adjacent to northern Thailand where an exemplary program of eradication coupled with dramatic economic growth has reduced production there to negligable levels. Lastly, genuine collaboration with the European Community to secure initial resources and expertise to implement and manage the program will assure that it is applied systametically, practically rather than emotionally, and with continuity.

We will ask Washington only for such highly specialized and technical assistance as sattellite output and ------. Burma will not ask the congress of the United States for one dime. There will be no request for assistance from the DEA or any other government agency. The United States will be invited and encouraged to audit the process and verify progress at all stages and Burma throw open its doors to unrestricted on-site inspection by the State Department Narcotics Control Board. But Burma - and the world - need to see the Golden Triangle shut down and this is far too serious a matter to be mismanaged and manipulated and subsumed in the vagaries and hysterias of American domestic politics or media hype. We will have a practical, effective and expiditious solution to the highly complex Problem of Narcotics Production and Distribution, we will have no simple-minded, crass, hysterical and demonstrably ckqcatastrophically ineffective and counterproductive American produced episode of the ongoing black comedy miniseries known as the War on Drugs.

As a loyal American citizen, I made these recommendations with a clear conciense and a settled mind after considerable investigation and reflection. After reviewing the 1977 House Select Committee on Narcotics (the last time major policy initiatives in the Golden Triangle were reviewed) I met with the ---- of the House Committee on Narcotics. I was pleased and even quite hopeful when contacts at the State Department referred me to Ms. Joan Vail a senior staffer of Drug Czar William Bennett who arranged a meeting at the EOB attended by narcotics policy officials of the DEA and at NSC.

But it was clear from these and other meetings held on Washington this winter and spring that US policy toward narcotics producing regions is locked into a single-option formula - supression and non-negotiation - and so thoroughly politicised that there exists no possibility meaningful review.

The fruits of this policy are evident in statistics of production and consumption and they literally howl from the headlines and the evening news. They have a War on Drugs in

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Columbia and, not only is it a failure in terms of reducing cocaine production, it is questionable whether that society will ever recover from the violence, disorder and genuine anarchy that the War on Drugs has produced. Panama was invaded ostensibly as an act in the War on Drugs with the result that Dover AFB and Ft. Bragg have replaced Noreiga's villas as major distribution centers for cocaine passing through Panama. The War on Drugs has brought US-Mexican relations to their lowest point since the days of Pancho Villa with absolutely no amelioration of Mexico's role in production and trafficking.

It is hard to imagine a more conspicuous litany of failure and disaster as a result of unrelenting, unreasoning application of a thoroughly politicised wrong headed policy unless one is intimately familiar with the dynamics of American policy toward Vietnam.

Burma, emerging from a half-century of war, hardship and tyrrany niether needs nor deserves any of this. The tragedies wrought by heroin and its increasing availability do not permit anyone with a conscience to risk, let alone openly court, this kind of failure here. Burma, with western assistance and international collaboration, will achieve the objectives America wants and needs, but the stakes are too high and the outcome too important to let the drunk with the worst driving record behind the wheel again, even if he is the chief of police.

The Emperor has no clothes. The the continuing application of the supposed solution is directly related to the growth of the problem. The War on Drugs is as naked a failure as the War in Vietnam. Just as US policy prohibited the flexibility necessary for the South Vietnamese to establish legitimate institutions, thus assurring the triumph of organized tyrrany, US Drug policy prohibits the flexibility necessary to .viable alternatives for producers or ..separate the sheep from the goats among the traffickers.

Niether policy could reflect or adapt to the nuances of highly complex situations because both were derived from a peculiar and very destructive American inability to distinguish the moral from the moralistic.

The point at which American Drug policy ceased to be a legitimate attempt to find a solution to the scourge of narcotics and became, instead, another one of those peculiarly American moralistic crusades from which are derived all manner and types of immorality, emerged as I read the transcripts of the '77 House Select Committee hearings.

Determined to bring a moral set of arguments into the domain of the avvowedly moral Drug Czar, I set about doing my homework on US policy based on all sorts of premises about diligent inquiry and learning the lessons of history that he, as Secretary of Education, would have endorsed. This is how I came upon what is apparently the last existing copy of the last thorough public review of situation in the Triangle and US policy toward it.

It was, to say the least, a fascinating document and I eagerly anticipated framing my arguments around it and presenting them to Ms. Vail, Ms. Hedlund and others who would, of course be

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intimately familiar with its contents as it contained much pertinant data as well as the institutional memory of how current US policy was derived. Niether Ms. Vail nor Ms. Hedlund were even aware of its existance, nor were either the slightest bit interested in hearing about it, let alone taking the time to read it. Nor could I find anyone else currently in the US government narcotics policy apparatus who had read it either.

Yet the '77 hearings revealed, not only a cleat record of how a catostrophic policy was rammed down Congress' throat by discredited individuals with disasterous results, but it contained a veratible arsenal of ammunition for Carter-bashing. Surely the dedicated young republican red-hots in Bennets office would be interested in that.

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To summarize: In 1975, Mr. Joe Nellis, then Chief Counsel to the House Select Committee, visited Thailand and conducted an eshaustive and painstaking on-site review of the situation in the Golden Triangle. In the best American tradition, he went to the source of the problem, kept an open mind, interviewed reprenentatives from all sides of the question, listened carefully to what they had to say, considered the practical options and came away with a realistic and innovative solution.

Nellis even met with Khun Sa himself and heard him out as he offered a 5 year buy out plan allowing for compensation for his people and his operation while a transition to other primary crops and sources of income was made. Nellis believed this was genuine enough at least to consider, especially since there were plenty of potential sticks to go along with the carrot of economic compensation demanded by the warlord.

The biggest stick was another offer, this one from Gen. Bo Mya, leader of the Karen ethnic resistance in Burma and a fundamentalist Christian whose antipathy to opium cultivation was well known and well documented. Gen Mya apealed for a green light from washington and minimal US assistance to enable the Karen to apply military pressure to hold Khun Sa's feet to the fire and,if necessary, force him out of business.

To Nellis, this seemed a practical and, indeed, a moral thing to do. After all, the modern problem of opium in the triangle had its origins in the expedient policies of the CIA and the vagaries of Thai security considerations, particularly in the wake of the collapse of the US position in Indochina. Furthermore, opium itself had been introduced to the region by the British. There was just no morally defensible manner by which the blame for this situation could be left entirely at the doorstep of these people.

He thought Khun Sa deserved a chance to get out of a business we (the US and our Thai allies) had connived in from the get-go. Certainly Gen. Mya and his long suffering Karen deserved a chance to rid their region of a plague visited upon themselves and the rest of the world for which they were, certainly, in no way responsible.

But Nellis had not reckoned on the consummate moralism of the Carter Administration, incarnate, in this case, in the Chief White House Narcotics Advisor, the pot-smoking Dr. Peter Bourne. Bourne killed the Nellis plan stone cold dead. And the notorious Dr. rejected any collaboration with the "notorious Bo Mya" on the grounds that he lacked any "international standing or recognition".

Wherever he is today, Dr. Bourne might wish to know that some xxxx thousand tons and xxx thousand deaths later, the Nellis Plan

CIA Thru air America Thai insurgency '76 coup. revolution (73 revolution left of center went into the jungle - united '81

Khun Sa developed his ties with the Thai generals during this period

→ great international success. domestically it was a disaste

- minus US participation - is exactly what we're going to do.

Gen. Bo Mya is President of the DAB and the developing political situation in Burma leaves him completely in the drivers seat as far as the Golden Triangle is concerned. So who is this man to whom the Triangle has effectively fallen, and why does he not need Bill Bennett to tell him what to do?

I could not help reflecting on the demonstrably notorious Dr. Bourne's characterization of Gen. Mya as "notorious" in light of a conversation recently with Mr. Tin Maung Win and Mr. Ye Kyaw Thu, ethnic Burmese officials of the DAB. In the context of a wide ranging, entertaining and somewhat cynical discussion about the personalities now coming forward in the new Burmese leadership.

"What about Bo Mya?", I asked.

"He's a saint." said Win.

"Yes", interjected the verbally irrepressable Thu, "Gen Mya started out as a very crude, uneducated, ruthless man. But he has stuck to his principles, and, over the years of struggle he has grown into something larger than life. He is totally uncorruptable, and absolutely moral. Yes, He is what you Christians, and even Bhuddists such as us, can recognize as a saint."

Personally, I prefer to think of him as a saintly man, but whatever he is, he has struggled in a just cause for just short of fifty years and he is, by any standard, a model moral leader. Americans who want Golden Triangle heroin off their streets can rest easy now that Bo Mya finally has the means to call the shots.

Bo Mya's struggle began early in 1942, when the Japanese Army swarmed across the Thai border headed for British held Rangoon. Then a Seargeant Major in the British Army, Bo Mya watched helplessly as resistance to the Japanese crumbled and, in their wake, came a puppet army of Burmese nationalists who literally went mad with blood lust as they massacred the defenseless Karen.

After spending the war in a Guerilla unit operating behind Japanese lines, Gen. Mya joined the army of newly independent Burma and when the agreement guaranteeing Karen autonomy within a federation was unilaterally abrogated by the Burman dominated Rangoon regime he went into rebellion against the increasingly repressive, ruthless central government. That was in 1948. Forty two years later, Bo Mya and his Karen have finally achieved their aim, and, in conjunction with other Ethnic resistance groups and a Burman internal and exile democratic opposition, they have succeeded into bringing what Amnesty International refers to as "the worlds most repressive regime" to its knees.

Bo Mya loves the United States and admires Americans. This sentiment extends to the ethnic resistance in general and the Karen in particular, and for very powerful historical and cultural reasons that date back to 1824.

In that year, Sarah Boardman Judson, an early American missionary hailing from --- Masachusetts, made contact with the Karen. Mrs. Judson was a public figure of great romance and mystery in her day, not unlike the astronauts of the Right-Stuff

period. Her Karen mission aroused great enthusiasm and was followed by an uninterrupted stream of American missionaries who expanded the Burma Mission to include several other ethnic groups now ascendent as the DAB moves into political power in Burma.

It is a matter of extreme irony that these groups, imbuded to American values for longer than most Indian tribes, who fought valliantly and successfully on the Allied side during World War II, and who have patiently endured forty years of genocidal campaigns by a socialist military dictatorship whom Dr. Bourne found worthy of his trust, have always been here to help deal with the scourge of narcotics in the Triangle.

Now they will finally get their chance.

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FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma
International Headquarters

It appears that we cannot rule out the possibility that SLORC, having sold all its land, and all the fishes in the sea, has now sold or is trying to sell the water itself in the Indian ocean to the Chinese. My collegue George Pittaway and I are concerned that such action could be enormously provocative to our friends in India. As you can understand, this is a matter of no small concern to us as well, and engenders a certain anxiety, if you will. We therefore seek your counsel on how to proceed or not proceed.

FYI today Tin Maung Win mailed to BoBo via expreess mail a 4 page DAB statement on the SLORC presentation to the LDC conference in Paris.

Tin Maung Win and George Pittaway join me in sending best regards.

Truly Yours,

Ye Kyaw Thu
Chiangmai Thailand

llectuals and peasants alike; soldiers and solicitors,

FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma
International Headquarters

THE FIRES OF SEPTEMBER

9/9/90

The SLORC is surrounded. Surrounded by the unseen, to be sure, but surrounded nonetheless. As the rains begin to fade in this fateful month, fraught with memories too frightening to contemplate yet too terrible to forget, the tortured soul of a nation is suspended in a silent shreik for solace. This month marks an anniversary of tragedy and treachery, bravery and bombast. This month the people will remember that the streets of urban Burma were turned into rivers of gore. They will remember the light of democracy seen at the end of the tunnel proved to be the remorseless oncoming locomotive of lunacy and murder, splattering those who would dare cry for freedom. September marks the hour of ultimate horror when tyrants turned hope into fear, exhilaration into bereavement and desperation. Echoes of Auschwitz were carried on winds of pain. The regime, a macabre distillate of all that is worst in mankind, stoked the furnaces of Insein prison with insane resolve, the better to obscure the carnage they had wrought.

The world has learned that violence as a problem solving mechanism is a primordially embedded compulsion in the organism SLORC. For SLORC to cease war on our ethnic bretheren is like commanding a shark to stop swimming and sink into the abyss, it is like demanding the sun rise in the west. They thirst for this war as a vampire needs blood to justify themselves as high priests and guardians of the national sceptre. Like vampires, SLORC will eventually be drawn out of its netherworld where the sun doesn't shine, into the light of day, where under blessed illumination's scrutiny they shall dissolve, blinded in the glare of justice.

But SLORC is not content to wage war on only one front. SLORC needs urban disorder in order to worship themselves in the self deified pantheon they have invented, in which they enshrine themselves as protectors of those they slaughter. In the absence of disorder, SLORC would provoke disorder, for in their deal with the devil they have found themselves in the bloodbath business. The only business in which they can succeed without really trying. The latest wave of arrests in which acting President of the NLD, U Kyi Maung was unspared, seems calculated to provoke SLORC's blood payoff.

In the wake of the carnage of September '88 heroes came to the liberated areas on the border, individally and in straggling groups, monks and laypersons from all walks of life, students, intellectuals and peasants alike; soldiers and solicitors,

There, showing kindness pregnant with historical portent, ethnic revolutionary forces and expatriate Burmese patriots greeted the brave and beleagured, nurturing their souls, giving sustenece to the hungry; salve to their grevious wounds. Once rested, the students formed the All Burma Stuents Democratic Front, the monks hoisted the banner of The Young Monks Association.

All agreed : To be an enemy of SLORC is not to be an enemy of the state, but quite the reverse. In solidarity and in answer to the clarion call, the Democratic Alliance of Burma was formed, uniting under one banner for the first time in history patriots from all segments of Burma's richly diverse ethnic and ideological tapestry. All vowed that in defiance of the the junta, the democratic destiny of Burma would be fulfilled.

Those left behind in the necroscape that is Burma continued nonviolent resistance to tyranny. heads bloody but unbowed. Despite their fears all struggled valiantly, each expending effort to the best of his or her ability, often in silent solidarity, each knowing that they were at an historical crossroads, and part and parcel to something greater than the sum of its parts. When the CRDB viewed the political landscape of Burma, we also saw the intrepid rise of political parties, great and small, out of which the NLD emerged as pre-eminent. Ex-PM U Nu, Ex- General Tin Oo, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to mention a prominent few, valiantly cast down the gauntlet of peace at the cloven hoof of SLORC itself, and were arrested for their trouble. Along with thousands of loyal supporters who wither away in prison, subjected to unspeakable cruelty and abuse at the hands of deaf butchers who hear not their screams, all lent credence to the maxim that "Stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage". Not when the people believe in a higher calling.

Those who enjoyed, if you will, an absence of incarceration performed above the call. They combed the country at a grassroots level, and found an audience eager after years of repression to hear their message of hope and national renewal rebirth and democracy.

By now SLORC had found itself an international parhiah, and noble governments championing the peoples cause cut SLORC'S purse strings. In its animal instinct for self preservation SLORC shamelessly pimped a bound and gagged victim, Burma herself, to anyone libidinous enough to pay for a tryst, assuring many that by the time the victim struggled from the gag and protested this molestation, the assailants could be long gone, stalking another victim. So go her forests and her fishes.

It soon became apparent that SLORC underestimated the world appetite for such unsavory festivities. In a desperate bid to [illegible] world community, SLORC, the self [illegible]

SLORC instilled confusion and paranoia, the people would elect puppets picked by the regime. Never ones to pull their own weight, they hallucinated a vision of a gullible world, one in which govenments might dispense cash like candy as a reward for holding the election. This, they reasoned in their invincible ignorance, would underwrite their depraved policies into the next millenium.

History shows that this reasoning was somewhat erroneous. They forgot about the Burmese people. In the patient eyes of calmly queued peaceful voters, the world saw reflected a message - and an eloquent message it was indeed - a resounding chorus for an end to bloodshed and the birth of brotherhood throughout the land. The people had beaten the odds. Yet their struggle was not yet over. SLORC had not counted on losing, and a new wave of repression began. SLORC was not yet finished "protecting" the nation.

Now we reach September. Who is protecting whom against what, and why? SLORC has embarked on yet another insane arms buildup to entrench themselves, squandering cash reserves needed by the nation, in order to kill the nation.

Come into the streets of Burma and we will kill you, sqwawks SLORC. Say what we don't approve of and we will kill you, sqwawks SLORC. Convene parliament and we will kill you sqwawks SLORC, over and over, like some braindamaged homicidal minah bird. What exactly are they protecting us from? The beast is in themselves, and if this is their idea of protection, the CRDB hopes the world can now guess at what SLORC's idea of war must be like. But will SLORC's thirst for misadventure be magically slaked by mere draughts of the blood of its own people? Any historical review of tyrants past suggests otherwise. SLORC's Chinese satellite ground station in Lashio, and soon to be delivered Chinese jet fighters and warships don't come to a bankrupt junta without strings attached. They come with the implied portent of vassaldom, and the potential for regional mischief- for - arms. It comes as no surprise that the old men of Tienanmen square would find in SLORC a bond in butchery. <u>Regional powers, beware the vagaries of SLORC! Thailand, wake up! India,</u> <u>help!</u>

SLORC must realize that they have miscalculated in their labaratory of the bizzare, and their social alcemy has created a Frankenstein of popular rage, uncontrollable by its inventors. What is clear is that lacking the sense not to wear a metal hat in a thunderstorm, it appears they will not voluntarily transfer power to the National Assembly. SLORC'S recent statements that the parliament is not ready or qualified to assume the mantle of leadership is perfidious baulderdash, and unworthy of further comment.

can say. The world has had two years to ingest and regurgitate their tyranny. They will not be caught unawares this time.

The vehicle to carry the nation across the threshold of democracy and away from disaster exists - the duly elected National Assembly. As a doctor takes the Hippocratic oath and must treat a patient whenever or whatever the call or circumstance, so must the National Assembly represent the people in their hour of need. They are chosen by those who defied the bayonnet. A sacred trust is theirs. It is our duty as Burmese people to rally behind the chosen leaders.

The governments of the world are going to have to come to grips with the reality that SLORC is a dangerous alien force of occupation in Burma, that these sons of Saddam hold the nation and parliament hostage, and all that that diplomatically implies.

The world will have to realise that sovereignty emanates not from the barrel of a gun, and that sovereignty is not something that inhabits a specific building, or even city. Sovereignty lies in people, and they have excercised it. They have elected their representatives to consolidate this mandate.

In tribute to those whose vision we have seen and shared, whose mighty electoral shout we have heard, The CRDB endorses the Gandhi Declaration and its implications leading to the convening of the duly elected National Assembly. We further call for all free governments of the earth to immediately bestow recognition of the National Assembly as the legal government of Burma.

This September a dangerous deadlocked state of affairs bodes ill for the nation. This impasse must be superceded if possible, without bloodshed. But this seems dboutful now.

The CRDB again calls for all patriotic elements of the Tatmadaw to immediately swear allegiance to this assembly. The Burmese people have every right to expect, and have confidence in, that segment of the Burma army which knows what to do when the illegal order to create disorder and bloodshed is given. The CRDB reiterates, and the Tatmadaw dares not forget the famous directive delivered on the eve of Resistance by founding father General Aung San "Eliminate the true enemy, he is near to you."

Ye Kyaw Thu
General Secretary

FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma
International Headquarters

H.E. Mr. I.K. Gujral
Minister for External Affairs
Government of India
New Delhi, India

August 6, 1990

Dear Excellency;

I sincerely hope this letter finds you in happiness and good health. I write to you on behalf of my esteemed collegue U Tin Maung Win and myself, Chairman and General Secretary respectively, of the Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma.

At the outset, I wish to take the liberty of extending heartfelt thanks to the Indian government for its noble stand in favor of democracy in Burma, and seek to enlist your continued support in this regard. Please be assured, I send this letter in the spirit of cooperation and in anticipation of the re-establishment of fruitful relations between Rangoon and New Delhi.

Given the current tenor of events, the CRDB deems it propitious to request permission to brief the government of India, in person, on salient options and initiatives pertinent to the rapidly evolving situation in Burma. We fervently feel such a briefing would be in the best interest of both nations, and will prove most illuminating to your government.

Upon the establishment of a democratic federal republic in Burma, the CRDB projects that there will be virtually no overarching policy issues arising with the potential to cause discord among our two peoples. We project that establishment of the abovementioned system of govenment is in the best interest of India.

The CRDB has maintained and continues to maintain a cordial posture towards India in general. These sentiments stem in part from our family backgrounds, described as attatched. Scrutiny of the CRDB record will bear this out.

It is in part due to this special relationship that the CRDB believes, among other things, that if a regional military power is to emerge pre-eminently on the world stage, by all means, let it be the power of the world's largest democracy. Indeed, the CRDB welcomes the emergence of India as a land, airborne, and naval force. As the world's largest democracy, India has the right, indeed, the obligation to underscore her commitment to democracy and regional security.

FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma

International Headquarters

UNDP: STOP SUPPORT SLORC IN BURMA

In response to the press reports in the Thai-English dailies concerning UNDP support to the Rangoon military junta (Slorc), allowing NGOs to coordinate projects within Burma, the Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB) registers vehement protest against any involvement by the UN and its agencies until peoples' representatives, elected in the recent general elections, are permitted to convene the National Assembly for formation of a democratic government. Unless this condition is unequivocally met, any entanglement in these scheme will only help cover-up human, physical, and environmental devastation that the Slorc has torn Burma apart.

The environmental security project sanctioned to be funded by the UNDP in the Shan state of Burma is viewed by all who are concerned in anti-narcotic drive as the UN agency's inadvertent support of the obvious collusion between the Rangoon miltary junta and the drug Kingpin, as both parties have made a truce which consequently frees troops from Burma Army and focuses its efforts on suppressing the Burmans, Shans and other ethnic brethren in the area.

At present, the United Wa State army and Khun Sa's Maung Tai army have been reported to have renewed fighting over drug trails in Shan state. Drug enforcement agencies from the UN and other countries, in particular, from that of the United States, have reported their failure and expressed their frustration in the inability to stop the ever-increasing flow of opium and other drug narcotics from that area to the West. That Burma has become and continues to be the world's leading opium producer is, regardless of how one feels, undisputed. That drug traffickers have the blessing from the Slorc also is the naked fact that goes unchallenged. In the prevailing situation, the Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB) raises serious doubts whether UNDP funds for US$17 million dollars earmarked for environmental protection would reach the area at all, if not, how much, if any, will be used, and more importantly, what is the required mechanism to monitor the monetary aid given to the Slorc that it is used as expected.

The military dictatorship denuded the proposed reforestation area north of Rangoon in its search for funding its continued campaigns of oppressio against people in middle Burma. Popularly known as the Dry Zone, it has a long history in Burma's struggle for independence from the yoke of British colonialism and from the grip of Japanese fascism. UNDP has allocated US$2.5 million dollars for that area. The CRDB, however, has ample reasons to doubt that the Dry Zone, that bore U Aung San and many of his compatriots, all heroes of Burma Independence struugle, and the people there, will be beneficiaries of the said funds. Instead, they will continue to be recipients of inhuman treatment in the hands of Slorc military dictatorship, for their support for restoration of democracy in Burma.

The roads that will be built with UNDP funds will only help accomodate freedom of mobility for Burma Army in its relentless endeavours to suppress its own people, as dispensaries will serve only to treat their troops wounded in dry season offensive against ethnic hinterlands. UNDP funds for the military dictatorship in Burma neither serve the interest of the Burmese people, nor the interest of the donors. The CRDB believes



FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma
International Headquarters

On October 1, President Bush received a petition from the United States Senate signed by Senators Daniel Moynihan, Edward Kennedy, Alfonse D' Amato and eight other members of the US Senate,protesting Slorc's flagrant failure to comply with the Customs and Trade Act of 1990.

The conditions of the Act include the transfer of authority to a civilian government, and the release of all political prisoners; failure to comply with conditions expressed in the Act calls for appropriate economic sanctions to be determined by the President. In the petition the US senators condemned the Slorc for its complete contempt for the elections and increased oppression, and for continuing arrests and stepping up its unjust war against ethnic peoples in Burma. Further, senators did not fail to express their abhorrence of the Rangoon military dictatorship's invasion of foreign diplomatic missions in utter disregard for internat- ional law.

Also the world fury is found in a joint Resolution Proposal where the European Parliament expressed its deep concern over the Slorc's refusal to hand over power. The Europen Parliament specifically requested the governments of Japan and Thailand to aid in stopping the destruction of Burma rainforest as well as to stop weapons sale to Burma. The Indian an Australian governments have furthered their condemnation for the Rangoon military junta repressive actions, especially imprisonment and house arrests of the leading national leaders and leaders from the NLD.

In the light of current world opposition to the Slorc for its unabated human rights violation and unethical environmental expliotation, the commitment for funding by the UNDP to Slorc military dictatorship undoubtedly raises the inevitable question as to the wisdom, if not the propriety, at least in the minds of the people of Burma the feelings profoundly shared by the Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma, whether it, the UNDP, has unwittingly contrdicted in spirit of the UN Charter, on which the auspicious world organization was originally founde

The Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB), Internatior Headquarters, joined by its chapters world wide, solemnly exhorts the UNI to reassess its decision to commit itself for funding to the military dictatorship in Burma before it is too late.

Ye Kyaw Thu
General Secretary

10 October 1990



FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma

International Headquarters

14 JULY 1990

APPEAL TO THE OFFICER CORPS, BURMA ARMY

THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA (CRDB) HAS OBSERVED WITH DISMAY THE CONTINUED STALLING TACTICS CYNICALLY EMPLOYED BY THE RULING MILITARY JUNTA IN THEIR REFUSAL TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. TRAGICALLY, JUNTA MALADMINISTRATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE ELECTIONS SEEMS TO BE LEADING THE NATION INEXORABLY TOWARDS BLOODSHED, ESPECIALLY THE CRDB IS AGAINST AT THE TENOR OF JUNTA STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO RULE OUT THE RELEASE OF DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI, ILLEGALLY DETAINED FOR A ONE YEAR SENTENCE LAST JULY. FAILURE TO RELEASE HER ON THE COMPLETION OF ONE YEAR IN JULY 1990 WILL BE TANTAMOUNT TO POURING GASOLINE ON THE SMOULDERING FIRE OF CIVIL RAGE. BUT ALAS, THIS IS TO BE EXPECTED, AS PRECIPITATION OF BLOODSHED IS THE JUNTA'S SIGNATURE METHOD FOR DISPOSAL OF DIFFICULITIES.

THE JULY 13 REMARKS OF BO KHIN NYUNT, UNDERSCORING JUNTA INTRANSIGENCE, WILL SEAL IN CONCRETE THE INTERNATIONAL POSTURE OF LOATHING TOWARDS THE BURMA ARMY. AND BO KHIN NYUNT'S DIPLOMAT-BAITING ENSHRINES THE TATMADAW (ARMY) IMAGE IN A HEINOUS NICHE IN THE PANTHEON OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND DISREPUTE. IT IS DEPRESSING THAT DOG OF DOOM BO KHIN NYUNT, NATIONAL CATASTROPHE INCARNATE, APPEARS TO HAVE HIJACKED NATIONAL INTEREST.

INITIALLY, THE JUNTA DEMANDED LAW AND ORDER AS THE CONDITION FOR RELINQUISHING POWER~AND THE PEOPLE OF BURMA COMPLIED. NEXT THEY DEMANDED THAT ELECTIONS BE HELD UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH CHAMPIONS OF DEMOCRACY THE WORLD OVER CONDEMNED AS DISGRACEFULLY RESTRICTIVE~AND THE BURMESE PEOPLE COMPLIED. THEN THEY DEMANDED THE DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION AND TO THEIR HORROR~THE PEOPLE OF BURMA ARE COMPLYING. IN FEAR OF THEIR OWN RULES, THE JUNTA SIMPLY INVENTS MORE RULES THROUGH EXTRAJUDICIAL IMPROVISATION. NOW THE CONSITUTION, THE JUNTA SAID RECENTLY, MUST BE LABORIOUSLY RATIFIED BY A PROCRASTINATORY AND IMPOSSIBLY COMPLICATED PLEBECITE. THIS DEMAND IS UNPRECEDENTED IN THE ANNALS OF DEMOCRACY. WHAT WILL THE JUNTA DREAM UP NEXT?

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THESE POLICIES, DEGENERATION OF THE IMAGE OF THE TATMADAW HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE EVEN YOUR STAUNCHEST OF APOLOGISTS ABROAD~ THE SHORTSIGHTED CORPORATE CONGLOMERATES WHO PAY FOR YOUR BITTER BULLETS~ ARE PREPARING CONTIGENCY PLANS TO ABANDON THEIR BUSINESS COMMITMENTS WITH BURMA~ THAT MEANS YOU. THE CRDB HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT BO KHIN NYUNT'S RHETORIC IS HORRIFYING INVESTORS. THE CRDB SOURCES INTIMATE

BURMESE ECONOMY PREDICT JUNTA INSOLVENCY BEFORE THE END OF THIS
THE JUNTA IS STILL IN POWER AFTER THAT, IT WILL ONLY BE BECAUSE
FLOATING ITS SHIP OF STATE ON A TIDAL WAVE OF HEROIN PROFITS.

CRDB REMIND$ THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP THAT THEIR CORPORATE
YMASTERS ARE NOT ALONE IN DESERTING YOU. AS REPORTED IN THE MEDIA,
NONE OTHER THAN BO SAW MAUNG HIMSELF HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES
FROM FOREIGN ENTITIES THAT ONCE THE GOING GETS TOUGH, WHICH IT WILL, HE WILL
RECEIVE POLITICAL ASYLUM ABROAD. THE DANGER IS THAT YOU, THE OFFICER CORPS,
WILL BE LEFT TO BEAR THE WRATH OF THE BURMESE PEOPLE ~ ALONE.

SEEKING OF ASYLUM IS THE PENULTIMATE INITIATIVE ENGINEERED TO SPARE THE
ELITE IN THE DICTATORSHIP FROM SUFFERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR
OWN MISRULE. NOT ONLY CAN YOU ASSUME THAT THE HIGH COMMAND WILL AVAIL
THEMSELVES OF A COWARDLY AND KLEPTOMANIACAL EXTRICATION FROM ANY DIFFICULTIES
THEY ORDER YOU, THE OFFICER CORPS INTO ~ BE ASSURED THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY
LAID THE GROUNDWORK TO DO PRECISELY THAT.

SO IT APPEARS YOUR LEADERS HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN YOUR WILLINGNESS OR ABILITY
TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE VAGARIES OF RIGHTEOUS CIVIL ANGER. INDEED, WHY
SHOULD THEY?

HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF THE OFFICER CORPS VOTING WITH YOUR HEARTS AND MINDS
TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY SEND A COLD STAB OF FEAR INTO THE JUNTA'S BLACKENED
HEARTS. BUT IN THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, AT LEAST YOU CAN TAKE HEART, FOR THE
HONOUR OF THE TATMADAW IS NOT IRRETRIEVABLY LOST. THE BURMESE PEOPLE AND
A HUGE NUMBER FROM YOUR RANK AND FILE IN SOLIDARITY HAVE ELECTED A
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE PEOPLE OF BURMA KNOW OF YOUR BALLOT. SOLDIERS
WEARY OF ENDLESS AND SENSELESS CIVIL WAR WERE HEARD IN REMOTE COUNTRYSIDE
URGING VOTERS TO CAST THEIR BALLOTS FOR DEMOCRACY. DISGRUNTLED CADRES
AMONG YOU ARE CIRCUITOUSLY IN COMMUNICATION WITH CRDB OPERATIVES, VOICING
THEIR SADNESS AND SHAME FOR CONTINUING REPRESSION.

YOU OF THE BATTLEFRONT HAVE SEEN THE MAIMED, THE MUTILATED, THE BLIND
AND THE DEAD AMONG YOUR COMRADES IN ARMS. YOU KNOW FIRSTHAND THAT THE
JUNTA CARES NOT A WHIT FOR THOSE VETERNAS OR THEIR LOVED ONES. THE CRDB
HAS VISTED THE FRONTLINES AND SEEN THIS TRAGEDY. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN THE
DEAD AND THE WOUNDED AMONG OUR ETHNIC BRETHREN FROM REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.
BUT REGARDLESS OF THE UNIFORMS OF THE VICTIMS, THE CRDB MOURNS THE SUFFERING
OF ALL, BECAUSE IN THE END, THEY ARE ALL OUR COUNTRYMEN.

THE GAUNTLET OF PEACE HAS BEEN CAST DOWN ~ THIS MOMENT IN HISTORY CAN BE
YOUR FINEST HOUR ~ BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE ~ YOU MUST TAKE THE STEP TO
WHICH ALL OTHER STEPS ARE SUBODINATE ~ THE TATMADAW MUST SWEAR ALLEGIANCE
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

THE TATMADAW CAN INSERT ITSELF AUSPICOUSLY INTO THE EFFORT TO

REBUILD THE NATION. REMEMBER THAT THE MATERIAL PRIVELOGES THE JUNTA ENJOYS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE NATION TODAY WILL PALE IN COMPARISON WITH THE FRUITS YOU MIGHT ENJOY TOMORROW WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE IN A TRULY PEACEFUL, PROSPEROUS AND HARMONIOUS NATION.

IN THE WAKE OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMED OCCUPATION OF WORLD WAR II, THE BURMESE PEOPLE DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO FORGIVE ATROCITIES VESTED UPON THEM. INDEED, WHEN THE OCCUPATION FORCES WERE LANGUISHING IN ALLIED PRISON CAMPS, THE BURMESE PEOPLE SHOWED UNABASHED KINDNESS TO THOSE WHO WERE THEIR TORMENTORS. THE CRDB HAS FAITH IN THE BURMESE PEOPLE'S CAPACITY TO FORGIVE THE CAPACITY WHICH IS STILL INTACT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT CARNAGE DURING THE LAST 28 YEARS OF TYRANNY FAR EXCEEDS THAT INCURRED DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION.

THE CRDB, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS NOT ABANDONED HOPE IN ABILITY OF THE TATMADAW TO REDEEM ITSELF. BUT WE WOULD BE REMISS IF WE FAILED TO TABLE THIS CAVEAT: THE LEVEL OF CIVIL MAGNANIMITY THE TATMADAW CAN ANTICIPATE IS PROPOTIONAL TO THE SPEED AND FERVOR OF ITS OVERT DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE BURMESE PEOPLE AND ITS SUBSERVIENCE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

IN FURTHERANCE OF OBJECTIVES LEADING TO PEACE, DEMOCRACY, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, AND REHABILITATION OF THE TATMADAW, THE CRDB IS RESOLVED TO ISSUE THE FOLLOWING DEMANDS:

1. THE CRDB CALLS UPON THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE TATMADAW TO IMMEDIATELY SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO THE ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

2. THE CRDB CALLS UPON THE TATMADAW TO EFFECTUATE THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS INCLUDING U NU, U TIN OO AND DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI.

3. IN THE EVENT OF CIVIL UNREST OR A GENERAL STRIKE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE JUNTA'S REFUSAL TO TRANSFER POWER, THE CRDB CALLS UPON THE BURMA ARMY TO REFRAIN FROM OBEYING ANY JUNTA ORCHESTRATED AND THEREFORE ILLEGAL DIRECTIVES WHICH WOULD RESULT IN VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PEOPLE.

4. IN THE EVENT THAT AN ORDER IS GIVEN TO PERPETRATE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE CIVIL POPULACE, THE CRDB CALLS UPON SOLDIERS SUBORDINATE TO THESE ORDERS BE THEY OFFICERS OR OTHERWISE TO IMMEDIATELY DISARM AND PLACE IN CUSTODY OUT OF HARM'S WAY, ANY OFFICER ADVOCATING OR ORDERING AFORESAID VIOLENCE, REFUSAL TO CARRY OUT ILLEGAL DIRECTIVES AGAINST YOUR OWN PEOPLE IS IN FULL ACCORD WITH INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED CODES OF MILITARY CONDUCT.

THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA REASSERTS ITS DECLARATION OF JANUARY 4, 1987 WHEREIN IT WAS STATED THAT:

" WE WILL SEEK EVERY MEANS TO RESTORE THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION TO ALL CITIZENS OF BURMA.....WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT ALL DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE RETAIN THE INHERENT OBLIGATION TO EJECT BY REVOLUTION A TYRANNICAL RULER. "

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OMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA HOPES THE BURMESE PEOPLE
BE SPARED THE TRAVAILS OF BLOODY REVOLUTION.



YE KYAW THU
GENERAL SECRETARY
THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
PHONE: (053) 212-797

THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA HOPES THE BURMESE PEOPL
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YE KYAW THU
GENERAL SECRETARY
THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

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Burma troops urged to mutiny

AI-based Burmese democracy move- has called on Rangoon soldiers to muti- if the ruling military junta orders troops attack civilians on Martyrs' Day on hursday.

"In the event of an order to perpetrate violence against the civil populace, the CRDB (Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma) calls upon soldiers subordinate to these orders, be they officers or otherwise, to immediately disarm and place in custody, out of harm's way, any officer advocating violence,' the group said in a statement received by AFP yesterday.

Thousands of people are expected to march through the Burmese capital on Thursday, which is also the anniversary of the death of Burma's independence hero, Gen Aung San, who was assassinated 43 years ago.

Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) which won a landslide victory in the May general elections, has been held under house arrest since July 20 last year despite international appeals for her release.

The military junta has yet to transfer power following the elections.

The CRDB statement said. "In the event of civil unrest or a general strike brought about by the junta's refusal to transfer power, CRDB calls upon the Burma Army to refrain from obeying any junta-orchestrated directives which would result in violence against the people."

The CRDB also called on officers and men of the armed forces to immediately swear allegiance to the elected national assembly and to release all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD chairman Tin Oo, and Burma's former prime minister U Nu.

U Soe Nyunt, a member of the commemorative committee, said in Rangoon on Friday that both the public and the various political parties would be allowed to pay their respects to the martyrs without restrictions.

But Maj-Gen Khin Nyunt, chief of the Burmese military intelligence and first secretary of the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), warned that action would be taken against mass demonstrations aimed at creating disturbances in the country.

The CRDB also warned the soldiers that any undue delay in showing their support for the newly elected national assembly would be taken into account when power was finally transferred.

"We still seek every means to restore the right of political expression to all citizens of Burma. We firmly believe that all democratic people retain the inherent obligation to eject by revolution a tyrannical ruler," the statement said.

"The Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma hopes the Burmese people will be spared the travails of bloody revolution," it said.

BANGKOK POST July 16, 1990

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Dissidents ask Rangoon troops to disobey orders

Agence France-Presse

A THAI-based Burmese democracy movement has called on Rangoon soldiers to mutiny if the ruling military junta orders troops to attack civilians on Martyrs' Day Thursday.

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Suu Kyi: calls for release

ATMADAW HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE EVEN YOUR STAUNCHEST OF APOLOGISTS

ABROAD ~ THE SHORTSIGHTED

Burmese dissidents: Tough military line may trigger violence

United Press International

Chiang Mai

BURMESE dissident leaders said yesterday that a tough intelligence chief showed the military junta would not yield power peacefully to the newly elected legislature.

"This hardline policy is frustrating the people and now it means that anything could happen," said Tin Maung Win, the general secretary of the Democratic Alliance of Burma, a coalition of ethnic insurgents, dissident students and exiled politicians. He spoke at a secret location in the northern Thai province of Chiang Mai which borders Burma.

The Alliance leader said the speech by Brig Gen Khin Nyunt, secretary of the ruling junta and chief of military intelligence, broadcast on Friday, indicated there would be no transfer of power and no release of Aung San Suu Kyi.

Khin Nyunt said the 44-year-old leader of the Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, was swept to victory in May 27 elections, the first National League for Democracy which was already being treated leniently because she was under house arrest instead of being imprisoned like many other political leaders.

He rejected calls from foreign governments for her release and warned the elected legislature and military would not tolerate any attempt to set up a government without military approval.

"In the history of Burmese politics I have never heard a leader deliver a speech like this. He sounded like a gangster, secretary of the State Peace and Development Council," said Tin Maung Win.

He said difficulty drawing up a constitution would have to be approved by other political parties and then indicated the military would hold onto power as long as possible.

Diplomats in Rangoon have said the military simply appears to be trying to ratified by the people in a national referendum.

Khin Nyunt also said elected legislators on the constitution would not take place. they must draft a new one.

"Now the people know once and for all that there will be no smooth transfer of power and will use all means possible to overthrow the military regime — including violence," he said.

The Alliance includes several armed insurgent groups fighting the military, but they have lost ground in the past year to tough government offensives.

The military-backed one-party government in 1988. It stepped in to crush nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations, killing hundreds of people, but then held the elections which gave a massive mandate to the N.L.D. the boldest of the opposition parties.

The military has promised to hand over power to the N.L.D dominated Parliament, but Khin Nyunt said the military would insist on "advising" the

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ALL BELLIGERENTS
CROB BELEIVES THAT POLI
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FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma
International Headquarters

STATEMENT

ON PEACE: THE FIRST STEP

1 June 1990

NOW THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN BURMA ARE OVER. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, THE RESULTS AFFIRM THAT THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD), UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF U TIN OO AND DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI HAS WON THE MANDATE OF THE PEOPLE. THE BURMESE PEOPLE AND THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA (CRDB) HOPE THAT A SMOOTH AND SPEEDY TRANSFER OF POWER WILL OCCUR. ONCE THE MANTLE OF POWER IS ASSUMED BY THE NLD AND THE GOVERNMENT IS FORMED, THE CRDB RECOGNIZES THE ONEROUS TASKS THAT THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO SHOULDER. AMONG THESE HERCULEAN IMPERATIVES THERE IS NONE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INTERNAL PEACE AND ETHNIC HARMONY.

PRESENTLY, THE WINDS OF CHANGE ARE SWEEPING ACROSS BURMA. THE NEW GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO HEAL THE LONG FESTERING WOUNDS OF DISUNITY~ WOUNDS WHICH HAVE BROUGHT FORTY TWO YEARS OF TRAGIC CIVIL WAR, THE FLAMES OF WHICH ARE STILL RAGING IN FULL FURY.

WE MUST BRING FRESH APPROACHES TO STOP KILLING EACH OTHER IN THE CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT BY EXTENDING OUR RECENTLY WON AND HOPEFULLY SOON TO BE EXERCISED POLITICAL RIGHTS TO ALL HER PEOPLE AS WELL AS TO ALL OPPOSITION GROUPS IN BURMA REGARDLESS OF THE ORIGINS OF STRIFE, BE IT ETHNIC OR IDEOLOGICAL.

THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA EXHORTS THE LEADER-SHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE ITS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES. THAT COMMITMENT SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN NEW GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVES TO WORK FOR ATTAINMENT OF INTERNAL PEACE. ONLY BY RESTORING INTERNAL PEACE AND FORSTERING ETHNIC HARMONY WILL DEMOCRACY PREVAIL IN BURMA.

FROM ITS INCEPTION THE CRDB HAS MAINTAINED THAT INTERNAL PEACE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH SINCERE EFFORTS BY ALL BELLIGERENTS TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, FOR THE CRDB BELEIVES THAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED BY POLITICAL MEANS; NOT BY FORCE OF ARMS.

IT IS OUR UNFLINCHING CONTENTION THAT WHEN THE NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT ASSUMES RESPONSIBLITY, IT PLACES AS FOREMOST PRIORITY THE COMMENCEMENT OF MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALL PARTIES IN THE BLOODY CIVIL WAR.

FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

P. O. Box 7082, Fairfax, VA. 22039 USA



FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HARMONY

The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma
International Headquarters

1 June 1990

THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA VIEWS THE UNIQUE COMBINATION IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AS AN IMMENSE ASSET: U TIN OO, A LIFELONG PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, REPRESENTS THAT SEGMENT OF SOCIETY WHICH UNDERSTANDS ONLY TOO WELL THE HORRORS OF WAR; AS FOR DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI, SHE HAS BEEN BLESSED TO KNOW THE VALUE OF PEACE, HAVING LIVED IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY SO LONG. WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH LEADERS YEARN FOR PEACE.

THE CRDB, ON THE OTHER HAND, DARES NOT OVERLOOK THE PAINFUL FACT THAT THE BURMANS AND ALL OUR ETHNIC BRETHREN, HAVING ENDURED PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR FOR NEARLY HALF A CENTURY, CERTAINLY DESERVE PEACE.

THEREFORE, THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA EARNESTLY CALLS UPON THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO TAKE REQUIRED STEPS TO OPEN MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF BURMA. IN SO DOING, IT IS STRONGLY ADVISED THAT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BE DECLARED.

LET IT ALSO BE KNOWN THAT THE CRDB IS NOT UNAWARE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION THE NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY PARTY IS CONFRONTED WITH. IN THE EVENT THE NEW GOVERNMENT FINDS ITSELF RESTRAINED FROM MEETING THIS REQUEST, THE CRDB WILL USE ITS GOOD OFFICES TO BESEECH THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF BURMA (DAB) THAT IT IS HONOURABLE ON THEIR PART TO TAKE NECESSARY INITIATIVES, AND AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, TO FACILITATE FRIENDLY DIALOGUE WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE OF BURMA (DAB) HAS CONSISTENLY MAINTAINED AN OPEN RECORD REFLECTING ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THE CRDB MORE THAN EVER IS CONVINCED THAT MUTUAL RESPECT, TRUST AND GOODWILL PREVAILS IN ALL PARTIES CONCERNED IN THIS RARE MOMENT IN BURMESE HISTORY, AND THAT THEY ALL ARE CAPABLE OF PLACING NATIONAL INTEREST ABOVE PAROCHIAL GAINS.



YE KYAW THU
GENERAL SECRETARY
THE COMMITTEE FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS



FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
P. O. Box 7006, Falls Church, VA 22043 USA

ORGANIZATION, BACKGROUNDS AND PRINCIPLES

The Foundation for Democracy in Burma is a philanthropic organization established to promote peace, prosperity and the exercise of basic human rights among all peoples in Burma through democratic means; and to advance public knowledge of and interest in Burma and Burmese affairs.

The Foundation for Democracy in Burma (FDB) was established in 1987 in response to developments in Burma which have alarmed the international community and continue to jeopardize the future of the country and the well-being of its people. For 27 years, Burma has been ruled by military dictatorship. A centralized economy and political repression have brought the country into economic ruin and caused widespread violations in human rights. Once prosperous, the country is today relegated to the ranks of the world's poorest and least developed nations. Hundreds of people have been detained, incarcerated or forced to flee the country for political reasons. Since September 1987 hundreds more have perished in clashes with the central government.

Yet, despite the harshest of measures, the people of Burma have found the courage to rise in spontaneous demonstrations against the military government and to express its will for democratic rule.

Today, Burma and her people are at a critical juncture. The assistance they receive from friends of Burma and the world community will help determine whether the country can make a successful transition from political repression and chaos to peace and stability under democratic rule.

To assist in this transition and to sustain the establishment of democratic processes and institutions, the Foundation will work with international relief agencies and volunteer organizations to:

-- provide material assistance to Burmese refugees;
-- assist efforts to furnish humanitarian aid within the country;
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-- launch a communication effort to educate the American public and its policy makers about Burma and Burmese affairs.

Advisory Board AMB. A. BYERLY · VIRGINIA BONEY · REV. JEROME M. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
WILLIAM P. [illegible]



FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
P. O. Box 7001, Fairfax, VA. 22039 USA

ORGANIZATION, BACKGROUNDS AND PRINCIPLES

The Foundation for Democracy in Burma is a philanthropic organization established to promote peace, prosperity and the exercise of basic human rights among all peoples in Burma through democratic means; and to advance public knowledge of and interest in Burma and Burmese affairs.

The Foundation for Democracy in Burma (FDB) was established in 1987 in response to developments in Burma which have alarmed the international community and continue to jeopardize the future of the country and the well-being of its people. For 27 years, Burma has been ruled by military dictatorship. A centralized economy and political repression have brought the country into economic ruin and caused widespread violations in human rights. Once prosperous, the country is today relegated to the ranks of the world's poorest and least developed nations. Hundreds of people have been detained, incarcerated or forced to flee the country for political reasons. Since September 1987 hundreds more have perished in clashes with the central government.

Yet, despite the harshest of measures, the people of Burma have found the courage to rise in spontaneous demonstrations against the military government and to express its will for democratic rule.

Today, Burma and her people are at a critical juncture. The assistance they receive from friends of Burma and the world community will help determine whether the country can make a successful transition from political repression and chaos to peace and stability under democratic rule.

To assist in this transition and to sustain the establishment of democratic processes and institutions, the Foundation will work with international relief agencies and volunteer organizations to:

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[illegible] • [illegible]
[illegible] • [illegible]
PROF. JOSEF [illegible] • [illegible]
WILLIAM [illegible]

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DB.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

President	Mr. Thaung Khin
Vice-President	Dr. K. B. Gulati
Executive Director	Ms. Sunda Khin
Treasurer	Mr. Aung Pe
Secretary	Ms. Tin Swe-Thant
Member	Mr. Bo K. Nyein

U Thaung Khin
4525 Cheltenham Dr
Bethesda, MD 20814
(301)656-9559.

Date of Birth : May 11 1920

Place of Birth : Pyapon , Burma

Education:
Rangoon University, 1936 - 1938
Lucknow university, 1939 - 1941, B.S.

Work Experience

1942
Translator & Announcer - All India Radio.

1943 - 1945
Burma Expert, U.S. Office of World Information
Psychological warfare team attached to General
Stiwell H.Q. , China, Burma India war theater.
Ledo,India.

1945 - 1946
Broadcaster, U.S. Office of War Information,
San Fransico.

1946 -1948
Broadcaster , B.B.C. , London, England.

1948 -1966
Public Affairs Advisor, U.S. Information Service,
U.S. Embassy , Rangoon, Burma.

1966 - 1984
Chief Editor, Burma Services, V.O.A. ,Washington
D.C.

11/30/84, Voluntary retirement.

Activities.

1987 -1988
Vice President, Burma American Budhist Associatio

1988 - 1989
President, Burma American Budhist Association.

1988 - 1989
President, Foundation for Democracy for Burma.

Bo K Nyein
4507 John Tyler Ct,3
Annandale, VA 22003
(703) 354 2278.

Education

Methodist English High School, Rangoon, Burma
1956 -1968.
B.E. (Civil), Rangoon Institute of Technology, Rangoon, Burma. 1968 - 1974.
M.S. (Math/Computer), Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois. 1982 -1984.

Work Experience.

1984
Sr Quality Engineer, Admiral Inc, Galesburg, Illinois.

1984 -1987.
Sr System Engineer, Surdex Corp, St. Louis, MO.

1987.
Sr Engineer, North American Phillips, MAGNOVOX, Greenville, TN.

1987 - Present.
Data Communication Consultant, D.A. Mini Project (Army), UNISYS CORP, VA.

Activities.

1966 - 1967
Executive member , School Council, Methodist English High School.

1967 - 1968
President, School Council, Methodist English High School.

1972
Vice President, Civil Engineering Association, R.I.T, Rangoon, Burma.

1974
Joint-Chairman, All Burma Strike Committee, U Thant Strike, Rangoon, Burma.

1974 - 1979.
Insein Jail.
Sentenced to 7 years by the Military Tribunal for leading the Students' Strike that nearly toppled the government,asking for Democracy and basic human rights.



Led the Pro Democracy students faction in the prison and staged a hunger stike for 10 days for beating the students in the prison.

1988 - 1989
President, Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma, Eastern Region, Washington D.C.
Executive Member , Foundation for Democracy for Burma.

FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
P.O. Box 2004, Fairfax, VA. 22031, USA

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Advisory Board

In its long-term efforts, the Foundation will focus on educational programs to promote public understanding and familiarity with democratic rules, procedures and institutions. Moreover, the Foundation For Democracy in Burma is currently working with the Burma Democratic Council (international) which is organizing an international organization that will work toward achieving democracy in Burma.

The work of the Foundation for Democracy in Burma is supported by voluntary contributions from individuals, corporations and other foundations. Funds are used for general operating costs, specific program initiatives and in the development and distribution of materials and resources. For example, the Foundation for Democracy in Burma has been contributing $500 per month toward the daily welfare of the students in their Burma Border Area.

As of December 1988, the Foundation for Democracy in Burma is exempt from federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donors may deduct contributions to the FDB.

Aung Pe
3020 Steven Martin Drive
Fairfax, Va 22031
703-476-3177 (Ofc)
703-255-1531(Res)

Education

B.S (Applied Physics)- University of Rangoon, 1957. Post Grad. studies in Elec.Engg- University of Illinois, 1961. Computer Technology- Control Data Institute, Arlington, VA, 1971.

Business Experience

Jan 1979 to Present

Tandem Computers, 12100 Sunrise Valley Drive, Reston, Va 22091- Branch Manager, Washington District Customer Engineering.

Oct 1973 to Dec 1977

Sycor Inc, 7926 Jones Branch Drive, Mclean, Va 22101- Field Engineer for Washington Metro Area.

Aug 1968 to Sep 1973

Richards Corporation, 1545 Spring Hill Drive, Mclean, Va 22101- Electronic Technician.

Nov 1961 - July 1868

Mahavizza Dhor Film Co.,Rangoon, Burma- Manager, Film Laboratory.

Jun 1957 to Aug 1958

University of Rangoon, Rangoon,Burma- Instructor in Physics.

Achievements and Activities

Foundation for Democracy in Burma, Fairfax,Va. Treasurer-1989.

Five Oaks Estate Homeowners Assoc., Fairfax,Va. Vice Pres-1989, Architectural Comm. Member-1986-89

Burma America Budhist Association, Silver Spring.Md.
President-1983-85; Organizer/ Fund Raiser- 1980-83.

Excellence in Service Award- Tandem Computers,Inc, 1980.

FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
P.O. Box 2004, Fairfax, VA. 22031, USA

Bylaws of Foundation for Democracy Burma

Article I: Name, Office Seal

Section Name The name of this non-profit corporation is Foundation for Democracy in Burma.

Section 2 Offices: The principle offices of the Foundation for Democracy in Burma shall be in the District of Columbia. The Foundation For Democracy in Burma may have such other offices, either within or without the District of Columbia, as the board of directors may determine or as the affairs of the Foundation For Democracy in Burma may require from time to time.

The Foundation for Democracy in Burma, shall have and continuously maintain in the District of Columbia a registered office, and a registered agent, who is a resident of the District of Columbia and whose office is identical with such registered office.

Section 3: Seal: The seal of the corporation shall be as follows: A circle with the words Foundation For Democracy in Burma written inside the circle.

Article II General

Section 1. Purposes The Foundation For Democracy in Burma, is organized exclusively for charitable and educational purposes. More specifically it is organized to undertake the following activities:

a) To educate the American public about Burmese affairs,

b) To provide humanitarian assistance to refugees from Burma.

c) To accept, hold, invest, reinvest and administer any

Advisory Board AMB A BYROADE • VIRGINIA B FOOTE • REV GEORGE W HILL, PhD • BISHOP JAMES K MATHEWS, PhD
LINDSEY MATTISON • ROBERT R NATHAN • MICHAEL MYO NYUNT • U KIN OO NG • LEE SHIN BOM
PROF JOSEF SILVERSTEIN, PhD • PROF MILFORD E SPIRO, PhD • EUGENE THAIKE • U THAUNG
WILLIAM P THOMPSON, JD • LOUIS J WALINSKY • AMB ROBERT F WHITE • U NEYAW NYEIN



The Committee For Restoration Of Democracy In Burma
International Headquarters

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION: COL ROBERT HELVEY

Col. Robert Helvey
Dean, Attache Training
Defense Intelligence College
Washington, D.C. 20340-5485

4 August 1990

Dear Col. Helvey;

As you will recall in our prior communications, we discussed the existence or lack thereof of a satellite ground recieving station of unknown power, the intent of which was also unknown, but whose origin is no About China. The site for this station is said to be in the vicinity of Lashio, in Burma's Shan State. Thailand is concerned that its purpose is for monitoring Thai military activities and communications in north Thailand.

You may also recall my inquiry attempting to verify Singaporean arms transhipments (of allegedly Fritz-Werner origin) to the Junta in Rangoon. The Shipment is said to have arrived via Burma's state run 5-star line in the month of June. Also we are concened about some forty tanks courtesy China, alleged to have been unloaded during July.

We have just recieved intelligence which, if true, could be a harbinger of serious SLORC mischief and possibly contribute to regional destabilization. George recieved the following information from a reliable source near the Burma-China border this morning, and was asked for opinions on the veracity of the intelligence and analysis as to what to do about it. To avoid confusion as to who believes what according to whom, the following is the verbatim text of the message recieved this morning without elaboration:

"According to 4 different reliable sources, The Peoples Republic of China has delivered ammunition, including radar equipment and MT submarine missles to Burma. Chinese ship had unloaded for 2 consecutive days August 12-13. Also expected delivery before the end of the year are: 12 of either F6 or F7 jet fighters and four naval patrol boats of either Hainan or Shanghai class. The total bill: One billion US dollars!

Japanese were very much upset and so were the Indians. As it is not possible under any circumstances that Burma could pay back this money, speculations are that China would obtain access to the Indian ocean in return. Certainly, India will take some action.

Perhaps you could check on the above information?"

Opposition Burma
Courtesy of Restore